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Abstract 
The number of humanitarian crises as well as their complexity have been increasing over the 
past 50 years. Among other reasons, this is attributable to the growing number of actors 
involved in relief operations who add significantly to the complexity of coordinating internal 
and external factors in order to alleviate the suffering of people all around the world. Hence, 
this research seeks to investigate those internal and external factors that influence the work of 
humanitarian workers in a negative way. They are referred to as challenges throughout this 
study and a comprehensive process is presented that has been pursued in order to identify them, 
assess their criticality in different contexts and to indicate potential solution strategies. 
Furthermore, an essential aspect of this research is the distinction of core challenges (CC) and 
root cause challenges (RCC) which are analyzed with regard to their mutual interrelations in 
emergency response (ER) and prolonged relief contexts, the latter being referred to as ongoing 
operations (OO) in this report. 
A comprehensive review of extant humanitarian logistics, supply chain and operations 
management literature has contributed to the creation of a categorization framework which has 
been used to group challenges into seven internal and five external categories. The findings 
from the initial literature analysis have been complemented by an in-depth single case study 
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Greece during March 
2017. Interviews with seventeen practitioners involved in all kinds of relief activities in the 
organization have been conducted. Furthermore, extensive observations of routine procedures 
in the field and in the Athens branch office environment have been made. Finally, an online 
questionnaire has been created and sent to UNHCR in Greece in order to collect practitioner 
assessments regarding the criticality of internal and external challenge categories presented in 
the initial framework and supplemented by a sixth external category identified during the 
research trip to Greece. 
Analyses of the collected information have shown a considerable degree of challenges 
interrelations. The distinction between CCs and RCCs appears particularly necessary since 
various RCCs have been identified which not only converge into multiple CCs across different 
challenge categories but also interfere with other RCCs. Hence, the priority to counteract those 
challenges is apparent. Apart from that, the analysis of the responses to the questionnaire has 
revealed that external challenge categories are perceived more challenging in both ER and OO 
contexts than internal categories. Especially Political Governance-related challenges are 
considered to be both most common and with the strongest (negative) impact on humanitarian 
operations while the majority of practitioners only see marginal chances to overcome them. 
Beyond that, even those internal challenge categories with numerous points of contact to 
external influences, such as Funding and Donations, have been assessed as more critical than 
other internal categories. Since political motives also play a decisive role in funding decisions, 
the overall negative impact of political activities on humanitarian operations has become 
apparent throughout this study. 
 
Keywords: emergency response, ongoing operation, humanitarian organization, challenge,  
categorization, criticality, assessment, UNHCR 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background: The Growing Number and Complexity of Humanitarian Crises 
Consulting the international disaster database EM-DAT it becomes apparent that the number of 
catastrophes with diverse impact on the affected populations has been increasing significantly 
over the past 50 years, culminating in peaks around the turn of the millennium (Figure 1). 
Furthermore, the trend of both natural and man-made (i.e. technological) disasters has been 
progressing almost uniformly thus indicating an interdependence of both disaster categories. 
This interdependence is further substantiated by the increasing occurrence of so-called complex 
disasters when a region is haunted by more than one type of catastrophe at the same time 
(Kovács and Spens, 2009). A prominent example for such complex disasters is the 2011 
Fukushima Daiichi catastrophe when a tsunami caused critical damages to a nuclear power 
plant leading to the radioactive contamination of a whole region in eastern Japan. More recently, 
a severe drought in the sub-Saharan Sahel region, concurring with sustained armed conflicts in 
the area (especially South Sudan), is becoming the world’s fastest growing refugee crises, 
according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Baloch, 2017). 
 
Figure 1: Occurrence of Natural and Technological Disasters over the Past 50 Years (EM-DAT, 2017) 
In consequence of the growing number and complexity of disasters the remits and challenges 
in humanitarian operations are diverse and usually vary largely between crisis situations. While 
most crises such as unforeseen natural disasters and the associated devastation and destruction 
of many people’s livelihoods require immediate response of Humanitarian Organizations (HO), 
some of those emergencies call for prolonged engagement in the area in order to support the 
restoration of self-sufficiency of the affected populations. These two different types of 
humanitarian missions are referred to as Emergency Response (ER) and Ongoing Operations 
(OO) (Jahre et al., 2016). As indicated above, the associated requirements regarding planning 
and execution are not consistent. In ER operations, such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake, speed is 
essential. This means to ensure prompt availability of large capacities on fast modes of 
transportation. Therefore, cost considerations are usually of subordinate significance. In 
contrast to this, during OOs such as the 20-year-old refugee camp Dadaab in Kenya, HOs seek 
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to satisfy all demand while minimizing costs in order to ensure their longest possible operational 
capability in light of limited project funding (Jahre et al., 2016). 
The requirements for the organizations’ logistics networks to satisfy the various needs (i.e. 
number and type of relief items) in different geographical areas characterized by unreliable 
local infrastructure and in light of omnipresent resource scarcity are huge (van der Laan et al., 
2016; Yadav and Barve, 2016). In order to facilitate planning and increase responsiveness of 
humanitarian aid, Jahre et al. (2016) have recently analyzed the optimization potentials of 
dedicated supply chains (SC) for OO and ER operations in UNHCR. They present a warehouse 
location model for joint prepositioning that also incorporates political and security factors in 
decision making. 
The significant influence of political factors on humanitarian operations as emphasized by Jahre 
et al. (2016) has also been identified in the course of this study. The political ambitions of the 
European Commission in its double role as European umbrella organization and main donor to 
the relief efforts in Greece are perceived equally challenging by humanitarian practitioners as 
the continuous attempts of the host government to maintain control over all decisions and 
activities taken on their territory. Furthermore, the coordination of the different actors involved 
in humanitarian aid appears particularly challenging since most parties other than the UN follow 
their own, not seldom politically motivated, agenda. The main donor to the operation in Greece 
(around 90% of all funding from European Commission) seeks to realize their plans for the 
affected region (here Greece, not Syria) while the host government strives to demonstrate its 
independence by refusing the issuance of official coordination responsibilities to HOs. At the 
same time, anti-authoritarian groups inside the country provide help to Persons of Concern 
(POC) (e.g. by providing shelter in urban squats) following not only a humanitarian but also a 
political motivation thus refusing any collaboration with official sites. 
“By defending the rights of refugees, UNHCR always ends up in political opposition to 
different parties. […] Whatever position we take and reaction we show – or even if we 
don’t react at all – we are exposed to [political] attacks from the outside. The only thing 
that we can do is to always and consequently stick to our mandate and to never seek to 
make the mandate popular towards any side.” 
Assistant Representative Operations, UNHCR Greece, 2017 
This thesis project emerges at a time when the civil war in Syria is at the height of cruelty and 
complexity with many parties involved. UNHCR, as the United Nations’ refugee agency, 
currently faces a tense situation in the neighboring countries of Syria where many displaced 
people search for shelter. The situation in Greece today, where the authors were granted access 
to the UNHCR operation during March 2017, is perceived more stable compared to 2015 when 
more than 860 000 refugees were registered (UNHCR, 2016). However, in view of the strained 
relationship between the European Union and the Turkish government, which agreed to hold 
back refugees on their way to Europe, another escalation of the crisis with increasing migration 
numbers into Greece is not an unlikely scenario. 
Finally, apart from emergency response in Greece, constituting the focus of this project, the 
identification and assessment of challenges to ongoing operations is of high topicality. As long 
as the civil war and the resulting inhumane living conditions in Syria as well as parts of Iraq 
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and Afghanistan are not ended, threatened people will search for shelter in the neighboring 
regions of the Middle East and Southern Europe. The risk of the current ER operation becoming 
an OO is significant and to some extent this is already starting to be the case when considering, 
for example, the Jordan refugee camp Zaatari that has become one of the country’s largest cities 
already. 
1.2 Purpose 
Although this study stands in line with a number of previous collaborations between Lund 
University and UNHCR, it is somewhat different compared to the thesis projects by Bendz and 
Granlund (2012) and Dahl and Lindén (2016). While both previous studies were related to the 
implementation of the warehouse localization model by Jahre et al. (2016), this project seeks to 
identify all kinds of potential challenges to OO and ER operations. Although the focus initially 
is on UNHCR, the purpose of the study is to generate knowledge with applicability for logistics 
operations of any governmental or non-governmental HO as well as the research community. 
Only few publications have discussed challenges in Ongoing Operations (L’Hermitte et al., 
2016) or differentiated to what extent challenges differ between ER and OO (Yadav and Barve, 
2016). Furthermore, a range of authors discuss the importance of regional and cultural 
peculiarities (Abidi et al., 2015; Yadav and Barve, 2016) in humanitarian operations as well as 
the time elapsed since the beginning of an operation (early/mid/late) and the number of actors 
involved (van der Laan et al., 2016). However, to the best of our knowledge no framework 
exists that indicates the varying interrelations of challenges in the different aforementioned 
contexts. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to contribute to the closure of this gap by 
providing a framework for i) categorizing challenges and ii) explaining the interrelations of 
different root cause challenges (RCC) which are converging in the core challenges (CC) as 
perceived by humanitarian practitioners in ER and OO contexts. Especially the concept of root 
cause challenges, as introduced in this study and inspired by the work of Yadav and Barve 
(2016), appears to be of particular importance to understand the diversity of influencing factors 
that need to be addressed in order to develop sustainable solutions for core challenges. This 
goes in line with Yadav and Barve (2016) who remark that “by developing direct and indirect 
relationships between the challenges, the case may be defined far more correctly than by 
considering each aspect in isolation” (p.327). It is therefore the main contribution of this study 
to scientific research in the field. 
Finally, the study seeks to develop and propose a structured approach to challenges 
management in humanitarian operations. For this purpose, the authors employ methods of risk 
management and specifically risk assessment originating from the area of supply chain risk 
management (SCRM). An assessment of various challenge categories has been made in 
collaboration with UNHCR personnel in order to identify those internal and external factors 
that are perceived particularly critical in either ER or OO. Together with the reflections 
collected from literature and practitioners on how to overcome or at least mitigate the negative 
impact of some challenges, this assessment provides a focal point for both, the humanitarian 
and academic society, to bundle their experiences and competencies in order to develop and 
test strategies. In this way, the study seeks to further bridge the two academic fields of 
Humanitarian Logistics (HL) and SCRM, an approach that has recently been pursued by 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) and Jahre (2017). 
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1.3 Research Questions 
RQ1: What are challenges in humanitarian operations and how do they vary between different 
contexts? 
RQ2: How are the challenges, arising from different areas within humanitarian operations, 
interrelated with each other? 
RQ3: To what extent can different kinds of challenges in ER compared to OO… 
 Q3.1: …occur during the course of a humanitarian operation? 
 Q3.2: …have a critical impact on the successful implementation of the operation? 
 Q3.3: …be overcome or mitigated, and those who can, how can they be influenced in 
       order to increase effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian operations? 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of Research Questions (Christofferson and Müller, 2017) 
1.4 Delimitations 
The authors’ insight into the field of humanitarian operations is largely limited to UN 
organizations, in particular UNHCR, that have been the research partner for the underlying in-
depth single-case study in this project. By its mandate UNHCR is a provider and cluster leader 
for Emergency Shelter and Camp Design & Coordination. Beyond that they are a supra-national 
organization usually falling back on/to the structures, monetary resources and support of the 
United Nations. However, there are many other, smaller actors (e.g. NGOs) involved in 
humanitarian aid operations with no such powerful background that almost certainly face 
different challenges or the same challenges but to a different extent. For example, Funding and 
Donations related challenges will be found in both, UNHCR and smaller NGOs. However, 
while UNHCR receives a lot money for the Greece operation, coming with significant donor 
influence, small NGOs might struggle to collect any funding at all thus being existentially 
dependent on donations. 
The authors have tried to include the NGO perspective to the study by conducting the same 
interview with a member (Field Mental Health Activity Manager) of Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF). However, the insight into the challenges experienced by NGOs is rather limited 
compared to the amount of interviews and observations collected at UNHCR. 
Finally, among the personnel involved in the UNHCR operation in Greece there is a high share 
of local (Greek) staff, most of whom have only limited or no experience in other humanitarian 
operations. Therefore, the intended assessment of different contexts has not been realized to the 
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full extent during all interviews with local staff members compared to senior international staff 
that has been involved in other regions and crises before, thus being able to make a more 
differentiated assessment of challenges in different contexts. However, the authors would like 
to express their gratitude to all participants in the interviews who provided valuable insights 
into practices and challenges related to individual tasks in UNHCR that have been included in 
this study. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The report is divided into six main chapters, the first of which is hereby closed. Throughout the 
subsequent chapters an overview of the researched scientific literature in the fields of HL and 
SCRM is given at first. Essential terms and concepts relating to the investigated field of 
humanitarian operations and challenges experienced in this context are defined and the 
development of the central Challenges Framework (Figure 8) through the combination of 
various HL and SCRM tools and concepts is explained. The framework is then applied to 
categorize the challenges discussed in reviewed literature and the creation of the Challenges 
Assessment Framework (Figure 13) based on SCRM theory is described. In the Methodology 
chapter the selection of an in-depth field study (with UNHCR in Greece) as the appropriate 
research strategy for this project is motivated and the relevant research design elements are 
presented. In this context, the UNHCR operation in Greece, as the study’s unit of analysis, is 
described in detail and the data collection methods applied during the case study are explained. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of all findings and insights gathered from the case study in 
Greece. Detailed lists of challenges discussed during the interviews are presented, while some 
selected examples are elaborated and supplemented by personal observations. Apart from that, 
the raw, unprocessed results from a questionnaire sent to UNHCR staff in Greece are displayed. 
The Analysis chapter of the report eventually puts together the findings from the literature 
review and the empirical case study. For this purpose a Combined Challenges Framework 
(Figure 24) is compiled and its potentials and limitations are discussed in the first part. The 
second part includes the analysis of the questionnaire results at the end of which two lists are 
submitted ranking the challenges (categories) according to their criticality in ER and OO 
respectively. Beyond that, a preliminary approach for managing challenges in humanitarian 
operations is suggested based on models and tools employed by different risk managing policies 
well-established in the UN/UNHCR system. Finally, the Conclusion chapter contrasts all major 
findings and limitations of the study and identifies areas for further research. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter the process and results of the underlying literature review to this study are 
elaborated. With regard to the research questions indicated in Chapter 1 and further discussed 
in Chapter 3, two main areas have been identified to be of particular relevance to this study. In 
the first section challenges in humanitarian operations and different approaches to classify them 
are discussed. The focus of the second section then is laid on risk assessment strategies coming 
from the field of supply chain risk management (SCRM). This interdisciplinary discussion 
seeks to demonstrate the potential of applying SCRM tools and strategies in the evaluation of 
challenges in humanitarian logistics. Each section closes with a framework inspired and adapted 
from the previously discussed literature both of which are later used and further developed in 
the analysis of the empirical study. 
The literature reviewed for this study has been selected following a structured approach. For 
this purpose, three databases – Business Source Complete (via EBSCOhost), Scopus and Lund 
University Libraries (LUBSearch) – have been searched for all combinations of the following 
terms: 
 
[humanitarian] 
OR [emergency response] 
OR [disaster relief] 
AND 
[logistics] 
OR [supply chain] 
AND [challenge] 
 
Furthermore, all publications had to be peer-reviewed and written in English language. After 
duplications had been removed (leaving 104) the abstracts of each publication have been 
reviewed in order to sort out irrelevant papers (leaving 46). Beyond that, a range of articles 
which have been obtained searching for [supply chain risk management] in the aforementioned 
databases, have been selected according to their coverage of risk assessment tools. 
2.1 Challenges in Humanitarian Operations 
The first framework to be discussed in this chapter relates to the core of this thesis project – the 
identification and classification of challenges in humanitarian operations. It is directly 
connected to RQ1 and RQ2 and will be developed over the following section. Therefore, in 
order to generate a common understanding of central terms and circumstances as used in the 
further course of this study the relevant definitions of Emergency Response, Ongoing 
Operations, Disasters and Challenges in general will be provided first. Thereafter, the main 
studies reviewed for this project will be discussed also highlighting sources of inspiration and 
identified gaps. In the main part of this section, the categorization approach for challenges is 
elaborated by presenting twelve factors – internal to the focal HO and its (SC) implementing 
partners and external to them – that are discussed in recent Humanitarian Logistics (HL) 
scientific literature. Finally, a comprehensive overview of all reviewed publications fulfilling 
the requirements for scientific research is given in form of a table (Table 3) and the Challenges 
Framework based on the literature review (Figure 9) is presented. 
2.1.1 Definitions 
Challenge 
According to the combined definitions of Cambridge, Collins and Oxford dictionaries a 
challenge is defined as a demanding or stimulating task or situation that needs great mental or 
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physical effort and determination in order to be done successfully and therefore tests someone’s 
abilities (Cambridge Dictionary, 2017; Collins Dictionary, 2017; Oxford Dictionaries, 2017). 
However, in order to simplify the concept of challenges in humanitarian operations, the authors 
define it as any problem or disruption that humanitarian workers face or experience during an 
operation. The reason for this simplification is twofold. First, it creates the same unequivocal 
understanding with every involved interview partner. Second, the rather vague descriptions of 
“tough situations” and “difficulties” in planning and execution of job-related tasks, where the 
word “difficult/difficulty” is used synonymously with “challenging/challenge”, are excluded. 
The latter is of particular importance, since the aim of this study is not to identify and describe 
“difficult jobs” but rather problems and disruptions impeding the smooth flow of a humanitarian 
operation. 
Disaster 
Each humanitarian operation, ER as well as OO, is preceded by a disaster. According to the UN 
Internationally Agreed Glossary of Basic Terms Related to Disaster Management, a disaster is 
“a serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread human, material or 
environmental losses which exceed the ability of affected society to cope using only its own 
resources” (United Nations, 1992). 
Disasters can be further classified according to: 
- Their source/origin into natural and man-made (United Nations, 1992; van 
Wassenhove, 2006; Baldini et al., 2012; Akhtar et al., 2012). When different types of 
disasters (e.g. tsunami and nuclear catastrophe) occur at the same time or in 
consequence of each other, this is usually referred to as “complex disasters” (Kovács 
and Spens, 2009). 
- Their warning time / speed of onset into sudden and slow/gradual (van Wassenhove, 
2006; Kovács and Spens, 2009; Apte, 2009, Holguín-Veras et al., 2012) 
- Their location/dispersion into dispersed and localized (Apte, 2009). 
Figure 3 shows the classic disaster matrix developed by van Wassenhove in 2006. Whereas 
Apte (2009) replaces the disaster origin by its location/dispersion and includes an indication of 
the difficulty level (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Explaining Disasters (van Wassenhove, 2006) 
 
 
Figure 4: Classification of Disasters (Apte, 2009) 
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Beyond that, Holguín-Veras et al. (2012) suggest to further classify disasters according to their 
magnitude of impact (social disruption, physical harm), the scope of impact (size and nature of 
impact e.g. debris after earthquake or water after flood), the temporal duration of the impact, 
the frequency and regularity of the disaster and the persistence of the threat emanating from 
the disaster. 
Ideally the Challenges Framework (Figure 8) at the end of this section should cover all types 
of disasters from both natural and man-made origin as well as their related challenges. However, 
due to the mandate of UNHCR and the single-case character of this study, its findings lean 
towards man-made disasters although many challenges have been reported in natural disaster 
contexts too. 
UNHCR focus on supporting refugees and asylum-seekers, returnees, stateless persons and 
internally displaced people (IDP) (UNHCR, 2013). They are usually referred to as UNHCR’s 
Persons of Concern (POC) and have in common that all of them are or have been fleeing from 
man-made disasters – in particularly civil/conflict hazards (Dahl and Lindén, 2016). For further 
definitions of the individual groups the authors refer to the study by Dahl and Lindén (2016) 
where the following diagram (Figure 5), illustrating the contexts discussed in this paragraph, 
has been obtained. 
 
Figure 5: Classification of Disasters Based on Their Origin (Dahl and Lindén, 2016) 
 
Emergency Response 
Emergency Response/Relief describes short-term measures taken immediately after a disaster 
has struck, such as transportation of supplies and equipment for search and rescue or to make 
provisional repairs of damaged infrastructure (Holguín-Vera et al., 2012). Furthermore, it 
comprises short-term recovery activities related to the management of donations and voluntary 
work force, the assessment of emergency needs and damages as well as the provisioning of 
temporary housing and clearing debris (ibid.). 
Due to the aforementioned characteristics, ER is closely linked to sudden-onset catastrophes 
(Jahre et al., 2016). In this context speed is an important criterion for the selection of transport 
modes (usually air or short-distance road transportation) in order to reach beneficiaries as fast 
as possible (ibid.; van der Laan et al., 2016). Demand uncertainty is argued one of the top 
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challenges in humanitarian logistics (L’Hermitte et al., 2016; Yadav and Barve, 2016). 
However, according to Jahre et al. (2016) the unclear demand situation is even more challenging 
in ER. Therefore, usually standard supplies are pushed down the SC based on the anticipated 
needs of beneficiaries (L’Hermitte et al., 2016). 
Ongoing Operations 
In this study all measures that go beyond immediate/emergency response are referred to as OO. 
Following definitions by Holguín-Veras et al. (2012), Jahre et al. (2016) and van der Laan et 
al. (2016) these can be described as long-term recovery activities that may continue for several 
years after a disaster has occurred. The main purpose of OOs is to support affected populations 
to return to normality and to even improve their quality of life by, for example, restoring local 
infrastructure or providing medical and food supplies for routine disease and malnutrition 
prevention (Holguín-Veras et al., 2012). However, the aspect of development aid is excluded 
from this study. 
Other than in ER, the demand situation is argued to be less uncertain in OOs due to more 
continuous demand patterns. Running large refugee camps like Dadaab in Kenya for many 
years provides HOs with empirical data that even allows demand forecasting to a certain degree 
(Jahre et al., 2016; van der Laan et al.; 2016). L’Hermitte et al. (2016) compare this practice to 
pulling appropriate goods through the SC. Therefore, even cost-efficiency objectives can be 
pursued in OOs as long as all demands are satisfied and responsiveness to the surrounding 
conditions is maintained (Jahre et al., 2016). 
2.1.2 Main Literature 
This study is based on the successful collaboration between Lund University and UNHCR, 
which has already produced two master theses and several scientific research publications in 
the past. The most recent publication (Jahre et al., 2016) focuses on improving demand planning 
and responsiveness in humanitarian aid by evaluating the optimization potential of merging 
dedicated ER and OO SCs in UNHCR as well as their affiliated supply networks and facilities. 
For this purpose, Jahre et al. (2016) present a warehouse location model for joint prepositioning 
of relief supplies, to be used for both OO and ER operations, that considers demand 
characteristics, logistics but also political and security situation related influencing factors in 
the mathematical optimization. To some extent, their research builds on the master thesis 
projects by Bendz and Granlund in 2012 and Dahl and Lindén in 2016. While Bendz and 
Granlund (2012) have identified quantitative and qualitative factors to be considered for optimal 
localization of warehouses in humanitarian logistics networks, Dahl and Lindén (2016) have 
investigated challenges in scenario creation and data collection connected to the 
implementation of such a localization model. Both, the influencing factors identified by Bendz 
and Granlund (2012) and developed by Jahre et al. (2016) as well as the challenges collected 
by Dahl and Lindén (2016) have served as inspiration to the categorization of challenges in this 
study. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only a very limited number of scientific publications that 
discuss challenges in humanitarian operations exclusively. Many authors have selected areas 
and tasks that are perceived as particularly challenging and discuss challenges observed in these 
contexts. Representatively for all other topics, the coordination of tasks and collaboration 
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between humanitarian actors in the crisis area, which was most often chosen as a core theme 
within the reviewed literature, is mentioned here. Akhtar et al. (2012), Balcik et al. (2010), 
Bealt et al. (2016), Maon et al. (2009), Noori and Weber (2016), Tatham and Spens (2016) and 
Tatham et al. (2017) have dedicated entire studies to coordination and collaboration challenges 
while many other authors discuss them in another context, such as Majewski et al. (2010) with 
a view to the future of humanitarian logistics. 
Among the most cited publications (according to Google Scholar 275, as by 6 May 2017) 
discussing challenges from a broader perspective is the article by Kovács and Spens from 2009. 
They provide an overview of 23 challenges in humanitarian logistics with a strong focus on 
African operations. For this purpose, they have gathered representatives of the largest 
organizations involved in humanitarian aid in Ghana for a two-day workshop: supranational 
agencies (e.g. UN), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international NGOs, national 
governmental agencies and national armed forces (Kovács and Spens, 2009). This approach 
enabled them to gain valuable insights into the diverse challenges as perceived by different 
actors with varying national/international influence, monetary support, mandate, local presence 
and experience in humanitarian aid. The authors furthermore provide a basic approach for 
categorizing challenges according to the type of disaster (see above), the disaster relief phase 
(preparedness or post-event including immediate response and reconstruction) and the type of 
HO involved (see above). Based on this they finally develop a “conceptual model to identify 
challenges of humanitarian logisticians” (Kovács and Spens, 2009, p.520). Unfortunately, the 
use of the model appears limited, since it is primarily geared to identify challenges without any 
explanation about the interrelations among different underlying challenges (Yadav and Barve, 
2016) that need to be investigated in order to develop sustainable solutions or mitigation 
strategies. Moreover, the identified “challenges in humanitarian logistics”, in fact, appear to 
originate from different, not exclusively logistics-related, areas connected to humanitarian 
operations. The “brain drain” challenge (Kovács and Spens, 2009), standing for the loss of 
experienced workforce in HOs due to the lack of attractiveness of working conditions (van der 
Laan et al., 2016), almost certainly also affects other units within HOs apart from 
logistics/supply departments. It therefore appears too one-sided or even misleading to discuss 
those challenges under the umbrella of humanitarian logistics rather than humanitarian 
operations as a whole. However, the study by Kovács and Spens (2009) has also contributed 
significantly to the development of the framework presented in this thesis project. Although 
grouped/categorized differently, a lot of challenges discussed in their paper have been 
considered and also their conceptual model has inspired the differentiation of internal and 
external challenge categories as illustrated in Figure 8 at the end of this section. Finally, their 
remark, based on the study by Norrman and Jansson (2004), to not only consider types of 
disasters but also their probability of occurrence and effects has confirmed initial considerations 
of the authors to investigate potentials for bridging the two academic fields of humanitarian 
logistics (HL) and supply chain risk management (SCRM) in order to assess the criticality of 
identified challenges. 
Another publication that discusses challenges in humanitarian logistics on a broader level has 
been delivered by Yadav and Barve (2016). They identify 15 post-disaster challenges which 
are further differentiated between immediate relief (comparable to ER) and long-term activities 
(comparable to OO as defined in this study). Total Interpretive Structural Modeling (TISM) is 
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applied in order to develop a hierarchical model for explaining the interrelations among the 15 
selected challenges by arranging them according to their mutual influential behavior with each 
other (Yadav and Barve, 2016). For this purpose, the authors have initially conducted a 
literature review and sent out a questionnaire survey to identify challenges. Thereafter a team 
of twelve disaster management experts from NGOs and commercial SCM has assessed 
contextual relationships among the identified challenges. Based on this, a ranking has been 
developed which finally allowed them to draw the hierarchy model displayed in Figure 6 where 
challenges at a lower level affect other challenges positioned above (ibid.). 
 
Figure 6: Hierarchical TISM Model of Challenges (picture section) (Yadav and Barve, 2016) 
By the work of Yadav and Barve (2016) the authors of this thesis project study have been 
confirmed in their initial assumption that it appears necessary to study the effects and 
interrelations between individual challenges in order to take appropriate measures to overcome 
those challenges in the next step. Therefore, the gist of Yadav and Barve’s (2016) hierarchical 
TISM model has been incorporated into the framework (Figure 9) where a distinction is made 
between challenges and root cause challenges. 
Throughout the reviewed literature only very limited approaches towards a classification of 
challenges have been identified. The categorization by Kovács and Spens (2009) according to 
type of disaster, disaster relief phase and type of HO involved has been discussed already. 
Yadav and Barve (2016) only differentiate between “immediate relief” (ER) and “long-term 
activities” (OO). Another attempt is made by L’Hermitte et al. (2016) in one of the few studies 
focusing on what has been defined OO earlier. However, they refer to it as protracted 
operations instead. Furthermore, the methodological approach of their research shows a 
remarkable, yet unintentional, similarity with the design of this study. L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
begin with a literature review in order to assess the coverage of protracted operations in 
scientific publications, investigate the meaning and importance of agility in humanitarian 
logistics and why agility is needed. In the next stage, case study research is undertaken. For this 
purpose they have visited Rome (Italy) where they have conducted the first phase of their case 
study with the UN World Food Programme (WFP). This first phase involves the collection of 
qualitative interview data through five semi-structured interviews conducted in WFP’s 
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headquarters in Rome. The subjects of those interviews have been, among others, 
“disruptions/constraints encountered in the field” (p.184) (comparable to the challenges 
investigated in this thesis project) and “methods used to overcome them” (p.184f.). Thereafter, 
the second phase involves the gathering and analysis of quantitative data through an online 
survey with WFP’s field logisticians involved in protracted operations. Using five-point Likert 
scales and multiple choice questions the “impact [of disruptions/constraints] on logistics 
operations” (p.185) and “mitigation practices” (ibid.) have been assessed. Further a distinction 
has been made between contextual and SC-related disruptions/constraints thus leading towards 
a reasonable categorization of challenges as required in this thesis project. 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) remark that “the volume of research in humanitarian supply chain risk 
management is limited […] and clear categories of risks and uncertainties encountered along 
the humanitarian supply chains remain to be empirically established and tested” (p.180). The 
aforementioned concept of contextual an SC-related disruptions can therefore be traced back to 
commercial SCRM where internal, network-related and external risks are differentiated 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004; Jüttner et al., 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004). This is also 
consistent with van Wassenhove (2006) who suggests to address this residual gap in 
humanitarian logistics research by employing existing frameworks of commercial SCRM to 
conduct risk analyses, vulnerability assessments and eventually improve the robustness of 
humanitarian SCs. 
In 2003 Jüttner et al. introduced a model to categorize SC risk sources. The model consists of 
three levels that have been slightly modified and extended over the years (e.g. Christopher and 
Peck, 2004; L’Hermitte et al., 2016). However, the core principle of distinguishing risks internal 
to the focal organization (Organizational), risks external to the focal organization but internal 
to the supply chain network (Network-related) and risks external to the network 
(Environmental) has remained untouched. The three categories including the most important 
extensions by other authors are discussed in more detail below before Figure 7 summarizes the 
concept(s) in order to facilitate the reader’s classification of the various terms and definitions 
into the overall context. 
Internal 
Jüttner et al. (2003) refer to this as organizational risk sources which lie within the boundaries 
of the involved SC parties and comprise labor (e.g. strikes) and production (e.g. assembly line 
failure) uncertainties as well as those uncertainties related to information technology. 
Christopher and Peck (2004) further distinguish the risks internal to the focal organization 
between process risks and control risks. Since processes in this regard are activities executed 
by the organization itself, they highly depend on the accurate performance of internally owned 
or managed assets and a hassle-free transportation and communication infrastructure. Potential 
failures in this regard thus constitute process risk. Control risks in contrast result from the 
application or misapplication of rules and procedures intended to steer the processes in a way 
that they produce the desired output. Safety stock policies and the associated diametrical risks 
of supply wastage due to obsolescence caused by over-stocking and supply shortage caused by 
under-stocking fall into this category. 
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Network-Related 
According to Jüttner et al. (2003) network-related risks emerge from suboptimal interaction 
between organizations within the same SC and usually manifest in chaos, as experienced 
through the Bullwhip Effect, and inertia, mainly regarding changing environmental conditions 
or market signals. 
Christopher and Peck (2004) discuss two types of risks arising from outside the focal 
organization but within its interrelation with SC partners. While demand risks are related to 
disruptions in the downstream flow of materials and information from the focal organization 
towards the end-customer market, supply risks represent the upstream equivalent. 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) combine two types of disruptions/constraints under what they refer to 
as SC-related risks and uncertainties – those internal to the focal organization and those within 
the supply network. Eight SC-related disruptions/constraints have been examined throughout 
their study with WFP: i) internal processes and standard procedures, ii) functional silos, iii) 
funding and in-kind donations, iv) unpredictable demand for relief supplies, v) suppliers of 
goods, vi) suppliers of services, vii) implementing partners and viii) commercial partners. 
Similar to L’Hermitte et al. (2016), van der Laan et al. (2016) put the internal/external concept 
in a humanitarian logistics context. Their so-called endogenous factors and the way they affect 
humanitarian operations are related to SC-internal management processes and predominantly 
concern aspects such as information systems, personnel or coordination activities. 
External 
External risk sources emanate from the environment that SCs exist in and interact with. 
Therefore, Jüttner et al. (2003) refer to them as environmental risk sources. Accidents like fire 
in a production facility or socio-political actions such as terrorist attacks as well as natural 
phenomena like earthquakes or extreme weather conditions fall into this category. 
According to Christopher and Peck (2004) environmental risks, coming from outside the SC, 
are likely to affect all parties in the network – not only the focal organization but also upstream 
and downstream partners as well as the marketplace. In doing so, environmental risks may 
affect products and materials directly (e.g. spoilage by contamination) or impair a particular 
node the SC uses (e.g. sunken vessel due to accident or attack). Due to carry-over effects, the 
focal organization might even feel the impact of disruptions caused by environmental risks 
although its own SC might not be affected directly, but indirectly through linkages to other 
industry networks (Christopher and Peck, 2004). 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) who refer to the same concept as contextual or macro-environmental 
risks and uncertainties, describe external risks as “catastrophic and/or isolated events 
disrupting supply chains (such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the 2011 earthquake/tsunami in 
Japan)” (ibid., p.182) rather than ongoing external influences. Furthermore, contextual risks 
and uncertainties are perceived as “uncontrollable” (ibid., p.187) and appear to occur less 
frequently in commercial environments compared to humanitarian operations (ibid.). Finally, 
the authors propose five contextual disruptions/constraints with potentially negative impact on 
humanitarian operations – i) physical elements in the disaster environment, ii) socio-economic 
setting, iii) governmental decisions, iv) security issues and v) infrastructural problems. 
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Van der Laan et al. (2016) refer to the aforementioned contextual disruptions/constraints as 
situational exogenous factors since they are related to the immediate environment of the 
disaster-affected area. The authors further distinguish non-situational exogenous factors which 
describe characteristics of humanitarian operations that apply independent of site or situation, 
such as demand uncertainty, involvement of numerous stakeholders, time pressure or general 
complexity of circumstances (van der Laan et al., 2016). 
 
Figure 7: Overview of Risk Sources Discussed in Commercial and Humanitarian SCRM Literature 
(Christofferson and Müller (2017); modelled after Jüttner et al. (2003); Christopher and Peck (2004); 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) and van der Laan et al. (2016)) 
As indicated earlier the disruptions/constraints as examined by L’Hermitte et al. (2016) appear 
comparable to the challenges investigated in this thesis project. Therefore, the five contextual/ 
macro-environmental and eight SC-related disruptions/constraints discussed by L’Hermitte et 
al. (2016) have been selected to serve as categories for the classification of challenges in this 
study. Due to the fact that they are in general (with small deviations) very similar to the 
endogenous and exogenous factors discussed by van der Laan et al. (2016), the authors of this 
thesis have decided to combine elements of both studies in their framework. In order to increase 
both clarity and comprehensibility of the framework, some disruptions/constraints and factors 
needed to be streamlined. 
The seven challenge categories grouped under Organization and SC Partners (highlighted red 
in the framework (Figure 8)) include all those factors internal to the focal organization as well 
as those external to the organization but internal to the SC-network (Table 1). 
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Table1: Organization and SC Partners related Challenge Categories 
Category Discussed by Definition 
Personnel van der Laan et al. (2016) 
Covers all challenges concerning human resources of 
HOs. 
Information Systems van der Laan et al. (2016) 
Covers all challenges related to computer and 
telecommunication systems, programs and software 
as well as their availability/ unavailability in HOs. 
Internal Integration 
van der Laan et al. (2016) 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
Includes challenges resulting from the interaction / 
lack of interaction between colleagues within the 
same HO. Covers internal communication and 
coordination as well as functional silos. 
External Integration 
van der Laan et al. (2016) 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
Covers all challenges resulting from the interaction / 
lack of interaction between HOs and its 
implementing partners (e.g. other NGOs, suppliers, 
commercial partners) as well as other actors involved 
in the humanitarian operation that HOs need to 
coordinate with (e.g. host government). 
Processes & 
Standard Procedures 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
Includes all challenges related to the compliance / 
non-compliance with processes followed within the 
focal organization and in the interaction between the 
organization and its implementing (SC) partners (e.g. 
procurement process). 
Funding & Donations L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
Covers all challenges concerning the availability of 
funding, the level of donor influence and quality of 
in-kind donations. 
Demand Uncertainty 
van der Laan et al. (2016) 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
Includes the challenges occurring in connection with 
needs assessment. 
 
The five challenge categories grouped under External (highlighted blue in the framework 
(Figure 8)) include all factors external to the focal organization and the SC-network (Table 2). 
Table 2: External Challenge Categories 
Category Discussed by Definition 
Physical Elements of 
Environment 
van der Laan et al. (2016) 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
Covers all challenges related to weather conditions or 
the topography of the crisis region. 
Socio-Economical 
van der Laan et al. (2016) 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
Covers all challenges in humanitarian operations that 
emerge from the interrelation of economic activity 
and social customs practiced in the disaster region 
(e.g. corrupt officials). 
Political Governance 
van der Laan et al. (2016) 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
Includes all challenges that occur in connection with 
political decisions made by the host government or 
another influential government in the crisis region. 
Also challenges related to the volatility of the local 
political climate. 
Security L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
Covers all challenges concerning the security 
situation in the crisis region: ongoing armed 
conflicts, armed (rebel) forces stopping/hindering 
humanitarian aid, looting/pilferage of relief supplies, 
etc. 
Infrastructure 
van der Laan et al. (2016) 
L’Hermitte et al. (2016) 
Includes all challenges related to the 
availability/unavailability/usability of transportation, 
communication and electricity networks. 
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Finally, Figure 8 gives an overview of the aforementioned challenge categories and therefore 
can be referred to as the initial version of the Challenges Framework. 
 
Figure 8: Challenges Framework (simplified) 
(Christofferson and Müller, 2017) 
 
2.1.3 Challenges Categorization 
Although a lot of authors discuss challenges in humanitarian operations, there are only few 
publications that distinguish between ER and OO challenges (e.g. Yadav and Barve, 2016). 
Since one purpose of this study is to work out how challenges vary between ER and OO 
contexts, the authors have decided to present primarily those challenges in the following 
paragraph that have been allocated to either ER, OO or both types of operations in reviewed 
literature. For this purpose, the ‘Personnel’ category is discussed in more detail in order to 
demonstrate the interrelation of core challenges (CC) and RCCs, thus explaining the Challenges 
Framework displayed in Figure 9. Two CCs have been selected, that are deemed more critical 
in ER than in OO throughout the reviewed literature. A short description of each challenge is 
provided as well as the sources discussing them. The same approach is followed when 
introducing one RCC related to each CC. Apart from that, all reviewed literature has been 
categorized according to the Challenges Framework and is presented in the summarizing table 
(Table 3) at the end of this paragraph. Further, it should be noted that although 55 articles have 
been reviewed initially, only 46 of them are considered in this study. This is mainly due to the 
fact, that several articles have been published in practitioner journals or magazines and thus do 
not meet the standards of scientific publications. 
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Figure 9: Challenges Framework (from Literature Review) (Christofferson and Müller, 2017) 
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Organization and SC Partners: Personnel 
CC: Lack of logistics and SCM know-how 
Abidi et al. (2015); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Kovács and Spens (2009); 
L'Hermitte et al. (2016); van der Laan et al. (2016); Kovács and Spens (2011); Majewski et al. 
(2010) 
The aforementioned authors have identified a general lack of specialist knowledge in the area 
of logistics and SCM on the field level that are perceived as particularly challenging during ER 
operations. The underlying reasons for this challenge are diverse, however the following RCC 
shall be discussed representatively. 
RCC:  Limited recognition of logistics importance in humanitarian relief 
   operations 
Abidi et al. (2014); Kovács and Spens (2009); Majewski et al. (2010); Dahl and Lindén (2016) 
Despite the large share of logistics activities (thus costs) in humanitarian operations (80 per 
cent according to van Wassenhove, 2006), the cost savings potential of efficient logistics for 
the entire HO has not been fully recognized yet. Logistics and supply are still perceived as 
minor supporting functions rather than a core discipline in humanitarian operations. This is also 
reflected in the low recognition of logistics expenditure in donor funding decisions (Majewski 
et al., 2010) when earmarked donations largely prohibit the use of the associated monetary 
resources for investments in any other activity than authorized by the donor (Holguín-Veras et 
al., 2012; Starr and van Wassenhove, 2014) such as efficient transportation or prepositioning 
of stocks. 
CC: Lack of training 
Stapelton and van Wassenhove (2010); Sheppard et al. (2013); Goffnett et al. (2013); Maon et 
al. (2009); Apte (2009); Kovács and Spens (2009); van der Laan et al. (2016) 
When discussing the absence of sufficient training in HOs, most authors usually refer to task-
based rather than general (web-based) trainings as for ensuring knowledge of and compliance 
with the organization’s code of conduct. The reviewed literature in particular discusses logistics 
and SCM-related trainings that need to be offered to both internal staff and local resources in 
the country (Kovács and Spens, 2009). Among other reasons, training appears particularly 
important in light of so-called brain drain, when skilled and experienced workforce leaves the 
organization due to a lack of perceived attractiveness (ibid.; van der Laan et al., 2016), and high 
staff turnover rates (Sandwell, 2001) which impedes the equal distribution of knowledgeable 
workforce throughout the organization. Furthermore, HOs are advised to provide training for 
their potentially low or even un-skilled volunteers in order to make best use of them (van 
Wassenhove, 2011; Apte, 2009). However, the sometimes described lack of basic literacy and 
numerical skills of local resources (van der Laan et al., 2016) can hardly be resolved by trainings 
within the scope of humanitarian operations. 
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RCC:  Lack of funding for training and preparedness strategies between disasters 
Tomasini and van Wassenhove (2009); Jahre and Heigh (2008); Tatham and Pettit (2010); 
Maon et al. (2009); Sheppard et al. (2013) 
Most HOs are existentially dependent on donor funding and usually unable to provide any 
assistance or relief without the physical/guaranteed availability of funds (Balcik et al., 2010). 
However, the fund-raising process for humanitarian organizations and operations is difficult 
(Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009). It is largely related to topicality and to a certain level 
also to the political brisance (ibid.) of a disaster, thus HOs constantly seek visibility in the media 
through positive reports (Balcik et al., 2010). Donors in turn, are usually interested in publicly 
supporting those emergency operations with the aforementioned high media coverage. 
Therefore, they often earmark their support towards those operations instead of funding training 
or preparedness (Holguín-Veras et al., 2012; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009). Finally, as 
Jahre et al. (2016) point out, preparedness strategies are not easy realized since funding is rarely 
transferrable from one year to another. As a consequence, usually at the end of a year, available 
donor money is invested in large amounts of stock congesting the logistics network (i.e. 
warehouses) in one location while other locations remain undersupplied. 
Two observations can be made from the ‘Personnel’ example above while also considering the 
full framework (Figure 9). First, ongoing or protracted operations (OO) and the challenges 
experienced in this context appear to be underrepresented in extant literature compared to ER 
situations. This is consistent with the findings by L’Hermitte et al. (2016), one of the few 
publications identified that provides insights into OO exclusively. Second, the degree of CC 
and RCC interrelations is significant. Figure 9 “only” illustrates CCs and RCCs that have been 
specifically assigned to either ER, OO or both by literature. However, the total amount of 
identified CCs and RCCs in the course of this research is much higher which means a much 
greater complexity of interrelations than displayed here. A reference to this is the case of 
earmarked funding as discussed in connection with Personnel-related challenges above. 
Earmarking not only affects the availability of donations for different purposes (such as 
training) but also reflects a more basic challenge – the lack of logistics recognition in 
humanitarian operations. Discussing the complex interrelations of CCs and RCCs in full details 
exceeds the scope of this literature review section. Therefore, the authors point out to the 
analyses made in the Challenges Framework (Figure 9) and provide the list of relevant authors 
in Appendix A. 
To conclude this section, Table 3 provides an overview of all reviewed articles in this study 
meeting the requirements for scientific publications. Many authors have discussed CCs or 
underlying RCCs, which can be assigned to a CC within one or more challenge categories. 
Hence, only because an author has been assigned to one category (e.g. Personnel) does not 
necessarily mean that the respective author has discussed unequivocal Personnel CCs but 
potentially rather a RCC that affects Personnel-related challenges. However, in order to 
demonstrate the widespread interrelations of challenges discussed, the authors of this report 
have selected the following form of presentation. 
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Table 3: Overview of Reviewed Publications sorted by Challenge Category 
Category Authors discussing Challenges related to this Category # 
Personnel 
Abidi et al. (2014); Abidi et al. (2015); Akhtar et al. (2012); Apte (2009); Balcik et al. (2010); Baldini et al. 
(2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Dahl and Lindén (2016); Goffnett et al. (2013); Holguín-Veras et al. (2012); Jahre 
and Heigh (2008); Jahre et al. (2016); Jahre et al. (2009); Kovács and Spens (2009); Kovács and Spens (2011); 
L'Hermitte et al. (2016); Majewski et al. (2010); Maon et al. (2009); Rodon et al. (2012); Sandwell (2011); 
Sheppard et al. (2013); Stapelton and Wassenhove (2010); Tatham and Pettit (2010); Tomasini and van 
Wassenhove (2009); van der Laan et al. (2009); van der Laan et al. (2016); van Wassenhove and Pedraza 
Martinez (2010); Yadav and Barve (2016) 
28 
Information 
Systems 
Abidi et al. (2014); Abidi et al. (2015); Adivar and Mert (2010); Anaya-Arenas et al. (2014); Apte (2009); 
Balcik et al. (2010); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Dahl and Lindén (2016); Komrska et al. (2013); 
L'Hermitte et al. (2016); Majewski et al. (2010); Maon et al. (2009); Starr and Van Wassenhove (2014); van der 
Laan et al. (2009); van der Laan et al. (2016); van Wassenhove and Pedraza Martinez (2010); Yadav and Barve 
(2016) 
18 
Internal 
Integration 
Abidi et al. (2014); Abidi et al. (2015); Akhtar et al. (2012); Apte (2009); Balcik and Beamon (2008); Balcik et 
al. (2010); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Dahl and Lindén (2016); Holguín-Veras et al. (2012); 
Kovács and Spens (2009); Kovács and Spens (2011); L'Hermitte et al. (2016); Majewski et al. (2010); Sandwell 
(2011); van der Laan et al. (2016); Yadav and Barve (2016) 
17 
External 
Integration 
Abidi et al. (2015); Adivar and Mert (2010); Akhtar et al. (2012); Apte (2009); Balcik and Beamon (2008); 
Balcik et al. (2010); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Dahl and Lindén (2016); Goffnet et al. (2013); 
Holguín-Veras et al. (2012); Jahre et al. (2009); Komrska et al. (2013); Kovács and Spens (2007); Kovács and 
Spens (2009); Kovács and Spens (2011); L'Hermitte et al. (2016); Majewski et al. (2010); Maon et al. (2009); 
Noori and Weber (2016); Rodon et al. (2012); Sandwell (2011); Serrato-Garcia et al. (2016); Sheppard et al. 
(2013); Sienou and Karduck (2012); Simpson and Hancock (2009); Simpson et al. (2009); Stapelton and van 
Wassenhove (2010); Starr and van Wassenhove (2014); Tatham and Pettit (2010); Tatham (2012); Tatham and 
Spens (2016); Tatham et al. (2017); van der Laan et al. (2016); Yadav and Barve (2016) 
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Processes and 
Standard 
Procedures 
Abidi et al. (2014); Abidi et al. (2015); Adivar and Mert (2010); Alem et al. (2016); Balcik et al. (2010); Baldini 
et al. (2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Holguín-Veras et al. (2012); Jahre and Fabbe-Costes (2015); Komrska et al. 
(2013); Kovács and Spens (2009); Kovács and Spens (2011); L'Hermitte et al. (2016); Majewski et al. (2010); 
Sandwell (2011); van der Laan et al. (2016); Yadav and Barve (2016) 
17 
Funding and 
Donations 
Abidi et al. (2014); Abidi et al. (2015); Akhtar et al. (2012); Alem et al. (2016); Apte (2009); Balcik et al. 
(2010); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Holguín-Veras et al. (2012); Jahre and Heigh (2008); Jahre et 
al. (2016); Kovács and Spens (2009); L'Hermitte et al. (2016); Majewski et al. (2010); Maon et al. (2009); 
Sandwell (2011); Sheppard et al. (2013); Starr and van Wassenhove (2014); Tatham and Pettit (2010); Tomasini 
and van Wassenhove (2009); Toyasaki and Wakolbinger (2011); Whitning and Öström (2009); Yadav and 
Barve (2016) 
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Demand 
Uncertainty 
Adivar and Mert (2010); Alem et al. (2016); Anaya-Arenas et al. (2014); Apte (2009); Balcik and Beamon 
(2008); Balcik et al. (2010); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Dahl and Lindén (2016); Holguín-Veras et 
al. (2012); Jahre et al. (2016); Kovács and Spens (2009); L'Hermitte et al. (2016); Majewski et al. (2010); van 
der Laan et al. (2016); Yadav and Barve (2016) 
16 
Physical 
Elements of 
Environment 
Abidi et al. (2015); Akhtar et al. (2012); Alem et al. (2016); Apte (2009); Balcik et al. (2010); Baldini et al. 
(2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Holguín-Veras et al. (2012); Kovács and Spens (2009); L'Hermitte et al. (2016); van 
der Laan et al. (2016); Yadav and Barve (2016) 
12 
Socio-
Economical 
Kovács and Spens (2009) 1 
Political 
Governance 
Akhtar et al. (2012); Balcik et al. (2010); Holguín-Veras et al. (2012); Kovács and Spens (2009); L'Hermitte et 
al. (2016); van der Laan et al. (2016);Yadav and Barve (2016) 
7 
Security 
Balcik et al. (2010); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Holguín-Veras et al. (2012); Jahre et al. (2016); 
Komrska et al. (2013); Kovács and Spens (2009); L'Hermitte et al. (2016); Maon et al. (2009); Noori and Weber 
(2016); Starr and van Wassenhove (2014); van Wassenhove and Pedraza Martinez (2010); Yadav and Barve 
(2016) 
13 
Infrastructure 
Abidi et al. (2014); Abidi et al. (2015); Akhtar et al. (2012); Alem et al. (2016); Anaya-Arenas et al. (2014); 
Apte (2009); Balcik et al. (2010); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Holguín-Veras et al. (2012); Kovács 
and Spens (2009); L'Hermitte et al. (2016); Majewski et al. (2010); Maon et al. (2009); Sandwell (2011); 
Serrato-Garcia et al. (2016); Starr and van Wassenhove (2014); van der Laan et al. (2016); van Wassenhove and 
Pedraza Martinez (2010); Yadav and Barve (2016) 
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2.2 Bridging Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Risk Management 
As discussed before, in connection with the categorization of risk sources, there is a gap in 
humanitarian supply chain management (SCM) research regarding risk management strategies 
(L’Hermitte et al., 2016). In order to address this issue, van Wassenhove (2006), L’Hermitte et 
al. (2016) and Jahre (2017) suggest to apply mature commercial SCRM models in the 
humanitarian aid context. 
According to Natarajarathinam et al. (2009) “in supply chain literature, the sources of a crisis 
are commonly referred to as “risks”” (p.541). Furthermore, L’Hermitte et al. (2016) discuss 
risks and uncertainties in the humanitarian SC closely linked to “disruptions/constraints 
encountered in the field”. The latter has been identified as conceptually close (or even identical) 
to the challenges investigated in this study. 
The similarity of the underlying concepts behind challenges and risks is further supported by 
Norrman and Jansson (2004) and Manuj and Mentzer (2008) who define risk as the combination 
of the probability for an unfavorable event to occur and the consequences (equal to impact) of 
this event for the affected organization. They also highlight the possibility to calculate 
comparable risk-values for individual hazards. While risk sources have already been discussed 
as internal, network-related or external “variables which cannot be predicted with certainty and 
which impact on the supply chain outcome variables” (Jüttner et al., 2003, p.7), the 
manifestations of those outcome variables, such as costs or quality – but also health and safety 
(Norrman and Jansson, 2004), are referred to as risk consequences (Jüttner et al., 2003) or risk 
impact (Norrman and Jansson, 2004). 
Depending on the definition of challenges their impact on humanitarian SCs can be similar to 
the aforementioned risks in commercial SCs. Following the definition presented in Chapter 
2.1.1 of this report, challenges are problems or disruptions that humanitarian workers face or 
experience during an operation. Consequently, both challenges and risks create the need for 
undesirable additional efforts in order to avoid or mitigate negative consequences reflected in 
the SC outcome. Hence, it appears reasonable to apply the same tools and strategies as proved 
successful in commercial SCRM also in the humanitarian context to assess and address 
(overcome or mitigate) challenges in humanitarian operations. 
The second framework developed in this study therefore relates to the assessment of challenges 
in humanitarian operations and is geared to specifically answer to RQ3. The commercial SCRM 
process is presented, which comprises a varying number of steps depending on the respective 
detail levels discussed by different authors. However, according to Norrman and Jansson (2004) 
the core principles of risk identification/analysis, risk assessment and risk management are 
common to all SCRM processes. Hence, those three consecutive steps are discussed in the 
following section with a special focus on risk assessment and the matrix-tools used in this 
regard. 
2.2.1 The Supply Chain Risk Management Process 
In the following section a structured approach towards the identification, analysis and 
management of SC risks is presented (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10: SCRM Process (confined to essential steps) (Christofferson and Müller, 2017;  
following Manuj and Mentzer, 2008) 
According to Jüttner et al. (2003) it is the aim of SCRM to ”identify the potential sources of 
risk and implement appropriate actions to avoid or contain supply chain vulnerability” (p.9). 
In this context SC vulnerability is related to the adverse consequences emerging from the 
inability of risk mitigation strategies to outweigh the combined negative effects of internal, 
network-related or external risk sources and so-called risk drivers (calculated risks taken by an 
organization to reduce costs and improve competitiveness) (Jüttner et al., 2003). Apart from 
this, Norrman and Jansson (2004) emphasize the importance of collaboration between SC 
partners to effectively minimize the impact of SC risks by addressing the probability of 
occurrence or the severity of impact to the organization. 
This definition appears fully transferrable to the concept of challenges. It is also vital to identify 
challenges – and especially their underlying root causes – in order to develop sustainable 
solutions to overcome them or at least mitigate their adverse impact on the operation. 
The first step of the process has been addressed by the categorization of CCs and RCCs with 
help of the framework developed in Chapter 2.1 of this report (Figure 8). It is then decisive to 
make a comprehensive evaluation of all identified challenges under each distinct category, 
either by involving knowledgeable practitioners with many years of experience in humanitarian 
operations (“specialists’ judgement”) or by analyzing quantitative historical data (Norrman and 
Jansson, 2004). One tool to be used in risk or challenge assessment is the so-called Risk Map 
or Risk Matrix, which is presented in more detail in the next paragraph. Finally, taking into 
account the assessment results from Step 2, appropriate management or mitigation strategies 
need to be selected. Thus, depending on the criticality of the particular risk or challenge various 
approaches might be applicable. In other words, if the expected costs associated with the 
negative impact are insignificant, high investments in mitigation measures appear 
counterproductive. According to Norrman and Jansson (2004, p.452) it is therefore “important 
[…] to find the right trade-off between risk management (protection) cost and risk cost (impact 
[…])”. This seems to be particularly true in light of scarce funding for preparedness strategies 
in or between humanitarian operations (see discussion above). Table 4 has been created based 
on the findings of an extensive literature review by Jahre (2017) who provides a comprehensive 
overview of mitigation strategies pursued in commercial SCRM (“SCRM”) and humanitarian 
SCs (“HUM”). One strategy (discussed by Norrman and Jansson, 2004) has been added by the 
authors of this study. It is indicated by a star-symbol (*). 
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Table 4: Overview of Mitigation Strategies and the Contexts they are applied in (Jahre, 2017) 
Strategy Explanation and Examples SCRM HUM 
Centralization Stocks, production, distribution x x 
Collaboration Risk sharing, supplier development, information sharing x x 
Dynamic Assortment 
Planning 
Usable to influence choice and demand and to entice 
customers to purchase products that are widely available 
when certain products are facing supply disruptions. 
x  
Economic Supply 
Incentives 
Encourage additional suppliers to stay or enter into a 
certain market in order to avoid monopolistic situations 
and to secure multiple sources should a disruption 
occur. 
x  
Flexible Manufacturing 
Process 
Allow for adjustments in quantity and quality produced 
in their network; for example: varying between plants 
and/or production lines 
x  
Flexible Supply Base 
or 
Hedging 
Multiple sourcing options available, thus allowing for 
alternatives should one source be disrupted. One way 
realizing this is to develop a supply alliance network 
with suppliers in various countries. 
x x 
Flexible Supply 
Contracts 
Agreements with suppliers allowing the customer to 
adjust order quantities depending on need. 
x x 
Flexible Transportation Multi-modality, multiple carriers and/or multiple routes. x x 
Make-and-Buy 
Combination of in-house and outsourcing, which allows 
more flexibility in case of a disruption. Includes vertical 
integration. 
x x 
Postponement 
Utilizes product and process design concepts such as 
standardization, commonality, modular design and 
operations reversal to delay the point of differentiation 
in products, services, movement and other value-adding 
activities. 
x x 
Revenue Management Dynamic pricing and/or promotion. x  
Silent Product Rollover 
‘Leak’ new products into a market without making 
formal announcements. 
x  
Speculation 
Opposite of postponement, such as forward placement 
of inventory, forward buying and early commitment to 
the form of a product. 
x x 
Strategic Stock 
Inventories at certain ‘strategic’ locations (warehouses, 
logistics hubs, distribution centers) that can be deployed 
quickly in case of a disaster. Often shared by multiple 
SC partners, e.g. vendor-managed inventory 
x x 
Transferring * 
Either shifting risk to an insurance company (e.g. life 
insurance policy for employees) or to other SC partners 
(e.g. outsourcing of activities or moving inventory 
liabilities).  
x  
 
2.2.2 Supply Chain Risk Assessment 
According to Hallikas et al. (2002) risk assessment primarily supports an organization to set the 
focus on the most essential and alarming risks thus avoiding waste of resources and efforts on 
developing strategies to manage risks of minor significance. Furthermore, the authors 
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emphasize the meaning of the assessment outcome for the choice of appropriate management 
strategies. 
This study focuses primarily on so-called perception-based risk assessment tools which leaves 
other (quantitative) tool categories, where the probability distribution of risk plays a significant 
role, largely aside. Perception-based models are commonly used when hard data is not available 
thus probabilistic models cannot be build. Instead, decision makers have to rely on available 
business intelligence data and their intuitive understanding of the industry (Manuj and Mentzer, 
2008). For this purpose Hallikas et al. (2002) provide an internal-auditing tool to support the 
management decision-making process. The tool, as indicated in Figure 11, applies the two 
factors probability of risk occurrence and severity of consequences (or impact) on the 
organization that have also been discussed by Norrman and Jansson (2004) and Manuj and 
Mentzer (2008). Audit participants are asked to select a value between 1 and 4 depending on 
the estimated degree of probability (very unlikely, improbable, probable, very probable) and 
severity (insignificant, minor, serious, catastrophic). The multiplied values of both factors 
indicate a risk value in the last column of the table which might be used to rank the risks 
according to their significance. However, Hallikas et al. (2002) point out that their model cannot 
deliver an absolute value of risk. 
 
Figure 11: Risk Assessment Tool (following Hallikas et al., 2002) 
The completed table of the risk assessment tool might then be fitted into the Risk Map/Matrix 
(Figure 12) presented by Norrman and Jansson (2004) which provides an illustrative solution 
for presenting various risks to a SC and highlighting individual areas in need of attention. 
 
Figure 12: Risk Map/Matrix (modelled after Norrman and Jansson, 2004) 
Ideally, no risks should be found in the upper right corner of the matrix where the chances of a 
catastrophic impact on the organization are very high. Any risks that turn out to fall into this 
category will have to be assigned highest priority in the following risk management stage. 
25 
2.2.3 Challenges Assessment 
As motivated throughout this section, the two concepts of risk and challenge exhibit strong 
similarities. Encouraged by the recent publications by L’Hermitte et al. (2016) and Jahre (2017), 
both advocating for a courageous application of commercial SCRM tools and strategies in the 
humanitarian relief context, the authors of this study have developed an assessment framework 
for challenges. It is basically an enhancement of the Risk Map/Matrix discussed in the previous 
paragraph, extended by a third dimension in order to be able to also assess the probability to 
overcome a challenge or to mitigate its negative impact on the humanitarian operation. The 
Challenges Assessment Framework (Figure 13) can be used to indicate the criticality of 
different challenges (e.g. ‘lack of training’ and ‘corrupt local officials in the country of service’) 
in direct comparison with each other, thus within the same framework, or the behavior of the 
same challenges (or challenge categories) in different contexts. In this case one separate matrix 
has to be created per context. Thus, for example, the behavior of different challenge categories 
(e.g. Personnel or Funding & Donations) can be compared between ER and OO. This has been 
done by means of a questionnaire sent to UNHCR practitioners involved in the Greece operation 
as part of this study. Further information are provided in the section about data collection 
methods in the Methodology chapter of this report (Chapter 3.2.4). 
 
Figure 13: Challenges Assessment Framework (Christofferson and Müller, 2017) 
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3. Methodology 
This chapter presents the approach used to conduct the empirical study for this thesis, which 
has been carried out in order to explain, support and develop the findings from the literature 
review in Chapter 2 “Theoretical Framework”. It includes the research strategy, the research 
design, the methods used to analyze the empirical data and it ends with a description of how the 
trustworthiness of this study has been secured. 
3.1 Research Strategy 
During this thesis project, the aim has been to answer the identified research questions (RQs) 
in order to figure out what challenges exist in humanitarian operations and how they vary in 
different contexts (RQ1); how challenges interrelate with each other (RQ2) and the criticality 
of different kinds of challenges (e.g. Personnel-related challenges) in ER compared to OO 
(RQ3). 
The identified RQs provide assistance in finding the appropriate research strategy for a study. 
If the question or questions are seeking to explain some given circumstances, such as if the RQs 
contain a “how” and “why”-question, a case study is to prefer. If the RQ requires a wide and 
in-depth description of the investigated social phenomenon, this method is also relevant (Yin, 
2009). This is described by Yin (2009) as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 2009, p.18). As can be seen in the 
aforementioned RQs, this study includes strong how and what questions and a case study is 
thereby appropriate according to Yin (2009). 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis report, specific categories for classifying challenges have been 
developed. The authors have identified a gap in extant research regarding the interrelation of 
core challenges (CC) and their related root causes (RCC) in addition to providing solutions to 
them. This thesis is therefore entering the field of generating new or, to some extent, extending 
existing theory. The case study research method is strongly advised to be used in cases when 
developing and generating new theory (Meredith, 1998; Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 2009). 
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Table 5: Matching Research Purpose with Methodology (Voss et al., 2002; highlighting added) 
Purpose Research question Research structure 
Exploration 
Uncover areas for research 
and theory development 
Exploration 
Is there something interesting 
enough to justify research? 
Exploration 
In-depth studies 
Unfocused, longitudinal field 
study 
Theory building 
Identify/ describe key variables 
Identify linkages between 
variables  
Identify “why” these 
relationships exist 
Theory building 
What are the key variables? 
What are the patterns or 
linkages between variables?  
Why should these relationships 
exist? 
Theory building 
Few focused case studies  
In-depth field studies 
Multi-site case studies 
Best-in-class case studies 
Theory testing 
Test the theories developed 
in the previous stages 
Predict future outcomes 
Theory testing 
Are the theories we have 
generated able to survive the 
test of empirical data? 
Did we get the behavior that 
was predicted by the theory 
or did we observed another 
unanticipated behavior? 
Theory testing 
Quasi-experiment 
Multiple case studies 
Large-scale sample of 
population 
Theory extension/ refinement 
To better structure the theories 
considering the observed 
results 
Theory extension/ refinement 
How generalizable is the 
theory? 
Where does the theory apply? 
Theory extension/ refinement 
Quasi-experiment 
Case studies 
Large-scale sample of 
population 
 
 
Based on Table 5, one of the more suitable structures for research with a focus on building 
theory is an in-depth field study. Building theory represents either identifying or describing the 
following: i) key variables, ii) linkages between variables or iii) “why” these relationships exists 
(Voss et al., 2002). Since this study focuses on identifying challenges, how they interrelate with 
each other and to what extent they vary between different contexts, an in-depth field study is 
suitable for this thesis. Furthermore, the in-depth field study includes one specific case and one 
specific organization. 
As a prerequisite for the case, both the research questions and unit of analysis must be 
identified. The unit of analysis is ‘the case’ and can be a person, company, group of people, 
decision or event (Yin, 2009). During the case-based research it is not uncommon that the RQ(s) 
evolves and the constructs are modified over the time the research proceeds (Voss et al. 2002). 
3.2 Research Design 
Yin (2009) describes that research design can among others be a ‘blueprint’ for the research, 
including at least four problems: i) what data is relevant, ii) what data to collect, iii) what 
question to study and iv) how to analyse the result. The research design is not only a work plan, 
but contains much more. The main purpose is to help avoiding situations where the evidence 
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(i.e. the findings from the case study) does not address the original research questions. With 
this said, the research design handles the logical problem, not the logistical one, throughout the 
research (Yin, 2009). 
What follows below is the definition of the unit of analysis in this case study as well as a detailed 
description of the actual case. Furthermore, the case selection and data collection methods are 
explained. 
3.2.1 Unit of Analysis 
According to Yin (2009), the unit of analysis can be a person, a company, a group of people, 
decisions or events. The unit of analysis is therefore related to the problem of defining what the 
‘case’ is. This will be discussed in Section 3.2.2. A general guide in defining the unit of analysis 
is described by Yin (2009) as related to how the research questions have been defined initially. 
If the research questions do not lead to one unit of analysis being favored over another, the 
question is either too vague or too numerous, which will create difficulties in conducting the 
case study (ibid.). Having a clearly defined unit of analysis in the beginning does not mean that 
it cannot be revisited, due to discoveries made during progression of the research. 
The unit of analysis in this specific in-depth field study is the UNHCR operation in Greece. In 
addition to this, the possibility to add information and findings from other operations and 
organizations exists since interviewed personnel and respondents to the questionnaire might 
have different experiences from earlier operations with the same or other organizations. 
However, it should be noted that other organizations and operations are not part of the unit of 
analysis, even though their input is of high interest for this specific study. This is also consistent 
with the procedure followed by L’Hermitte et al. (2016) who have encountered the same 
phenomenon during their case study with the UN WFP. 
3.2.2 Describing the Case 
This project emerges at a time when the civil war in Syria is at the height of cruelty and 
complexity with many parties involved. UNHCR, as the United Nations’ refugee agency, 
currently faces a tense situation in the neighboring countries of Syria where many displaced 
people search for shelter, for example Turkey, Jordan and Greece. At UNHCR the refugee crisis 
in Europe is called the ‘Mediterranean Situation’. There are in particular three countries 
receiving the POCs in the wider region: Greece, Italy and Spain, where Greece has been facing 
the largest amount of arrivals during 2015. Figure 14 shows the influx by sea-arrivals to Europe 
during 2015, which has been around one million people in total. 48 percent of those sea-arrivals 
have come from Syria and 21 percent from Afghanistan. According to UNHCR, those two states 
have been the most common countries of origin by far (see Figure 14). 
Today, in the mid of 2017, the situation in Greece appears to be more relaxed compared to 2015 
when more than 850 000 refugees have been registered in the country (see Figure 14). As for 
2016 (Figure 15) and the first half of 2017, the numbers of arriving refugees tend to be higher 
in Italy compared to Greece (see Figure 15; UNHCR, 2017a). What is also important to know 
is that during the peak of the ‘Mediterranean Situation’, more than 10 000 POCs were arriving 
to the Greek islands per day (Supply Officer, UNHCR Greece, 2017). When the northern 
29 
borders of Greece towards the so-called Balkan Route had been closed in March 2016 (Figure 
14 visualizing the route), this created a new situation in Greece where more than 50 000 POCs 
are now stuck, not being able to continue their journey further north in Europe (Supply Officer, 
UNHCR Greece, 2017). 
 
Figure 14: Influx of Refugees to Europe by Sea during 2015 (UNHCR, 2017b),  
Balkan Route added by authors 
Also in March 2016, European Union (EU) member states and the government of Turkey have 
closed an agreement regulating the influx of refugees to Southeast Europe, the EU-Turkey 
Statement. The Turkish government agrees to accommodate new arriving refugees from the 
Middle East in order to prevent them from traveling to the EU as well as to take back all 
irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters. In return, Turkey is given financial support 
and the promise of accelerating the accession negotiations to the EU (European Council, 2016). 
 
Figure 15: Influx of Refugees to Europe by Sea during 2016 (Reliefweb, 2017) 
Recent developments, however, that have led to a rapid deterioration of mutual diplomatic 
relations, make the renewed escalation of the crisis in Southeast Europe with increasing 
migration numbers into Greece a real danger. 
With this said, the situation in Greece is still an ER operation. However, at the time this thesis 
is conducted, the operation is on the transition between the stabilization and the decline phase. 
It has become more stable and is now classified somewhere between the mid and late phase of 
an ER operation according to the consensus of the majority of interviewed UNHCR staff in 
Greece. Some would even claim it is an Ongoing Operation already (Associate External 
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Relations Officer, UNHCR Greece, 2017). 
As indicated in Figure 16, the Greek operation currently consists of a multitude of different 
camps and collecting-points for refugees. The largest share of the camps is owned and operated 
by the Greek military (Technical Unit, UNHCR Greece, 2017). Furthermore, it is noticeable 
that the camps in Greece are widely spread all over the country and designed to accommodate 
much lower numbers of POCs (several hundred up to several thousand per camp) compared to 
refugee camps in other countries. A prominent example for a converse approach – even within 
the same refugee crisis and the wider region – is the camp Zaatari in Jordan, home to almost 
80 000 POCs as by May 2017 (UNHCR, 2017c). There are many reasons to why there are 
differences. One of them is the geographical factor. The Greek territory consists of many small 
islands, what causes a certain spread of the arriving POCs. Another cause of the distinction 
might be, that the POCs’ goal is often to seek asylum in northern Europe, and not Greece. 
Therefore, many refugees see Greece as a transit-country rather than a permanent residence 
which is why no larger camps for permanent mass-accommodation were needed. Finally, due 
to a significant say of the Greek government in the localization process of camps, comparably 
small sites are spread all over the mainland for not further specified, presumably politically 
motivated, reasons. 
 
Figure 16: Refugee Camps and Collecting Points in Greece, Mid 2017 (UNHCR, 2017d) 
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3.2.3 Case Selection 
In an in-depth case study a single case is thoroughly explored by the researcher(s). Thus, in the 
context of an investigation of challenges in humanitarian operations, the specific case needs to 
fulfil a few requirements. First, a situation that exceeds the local population’s abilities to cope 
with by the means available at their disposal. Second, a humanitarian relief actor (preferably 
within a network of SC/implementing partners) to be observed. Third, the permission of this 
relief actor to observe their operations, i.e. the permission to be on site and accompany their 
staff for an appropriate duration of time (e.g. one month). Fourth, the permission and 
willingness of the relief actor to share insights into the organization and its challenges through 
interviews, observations of internal meetings or review of internal documents and 
communication. 
This study is the third master thesis project in a long-standing collaboration between Lund 
University (LU) and UNHCR. The good relations and personal commitment on both sides, 
UNHCR officials and LU researchers, have eventually created the opportunity to investigate 
the organization’s Greece operation within the scope of this thesis project. All the above 
mentioned criteria have thus been fulfilled. 
3.2.4 Data Collection 
In order to be able to create a well-structured and accurate research when using a case study, 
the way of collecting data plays an important role. This is done by using triangulation, which is 
used to combine different data collection methods while studying the same phenomenon (Voss 
et al., 2002; Yin, 2009). This practice is also referred to as “triangulation of methods” (Patton, 
2002). These different methods could, for example, be interviews, direct observations, 
questionnaires and content analysis of (internal) documents.  
Within an in-depth case study as pursued in this thesis, there are three different methods that 
are most commonly used, interviews, direct observations and questionnaires (Voss et al., 2002). 
The authors have used all of these methods and to some extent even content analysis of internal 
documents (e.g. Security Risk Management (SRM) passages in the UN Programme Criticality 
Framework). The different methods and how they have been applied is discussed below. 
During the first period of the field study, the researchers have spent time observing and 
developing an understanding of the case environment (i.e. the UNHCR operation in Greece). 
This has also included introducing themselves and explaining the purpose of their research to 
UNHCR staff members in order to arrange for interviews at a later time. 
Interviews 
Both Voss et al. (2002) and Yin (2009) state the importance of interviews in a case study. 
According to Voss et al. (2002, p.207) “much, but not all field data will be collected through 
interviews”. The authors of this thesis have largely followed this approach during the in-depth 
case study with UNHCR and a total of 17 interviews have been completed. The interviews have 
been conducted to answer to RQ1 and RQ2. In order to get as accurate and diverse challenges 
as possible, the focus has been on conducting interviews with a wide range of employees from 
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different UNHCR departments in Greece. Such as personnel from the ‘Supply Unit’ (e.g. 
procurement, customs clearance and demand planning), the ‘Field Unit’ (in charge of looking 
after refugee camps or so-called “urban housing”), the ‘Programme Unit’ (development and 
realization of projects and strategies to support the living conditions of POCs in the country; 
also tasks related to ‘Funding & Donations’), the ‘Technical Unit’ (in charge of camp-design 
related issues, such as the provision of sufficient WASH facilities) or the ‘Relocation Unit’ 
(planning and execution of projects to accommodate POCs in permanent housing facilities i.e. 
apartments – in the long run). 
Not only has interviewing different units been a way of collecting a wide range of challenges, 
but also to involve different positions / job titles such as Senior Field Assistant or Associate 
External Relations Officer. Table 6 provides a summary of all interviews conducted as well as 
the respective titles of all involved interview partners. 
When doing case-based research, the interviews will rather follow guided conversation than a 
structured interview. Thereby, it follows a more qualitative approach (Yin, 2009; Bryman and 
Bell, 2015). When conducting qualitative interviews, there are two major alternative methods 
to be used, either doing unstructured (sometimes also referred to as almost unstructured) or 
semi-structured interviews (Bryman and Bell, 2015). In almost unstructured interviews the 
researchers, according to Bryman and Bell (2015), are not following an interview-guide but 
rather short notes and talk freely. Semi-structured interviews, in turn, follow the approach of 
having a list of preselected questions (e.g. an interview-guide) more, but with a great deal of 
freedom to also ask other – related – questions or to pick up on what the interview partners are 
answering (ibid.). 
In order to be prepared for both of the above mentioned interview situations, the authors have 
prepared an interview-guide based on the identified challenge categories as discussed in 
Chapter 2.1. The interview-guide, which can be reviewed in Appendix B, is structured as 
follows. First, an introduction to the study (i.e. the thesis project) is given, explaining the 
purpose of the research and the interviews. Second, the most relevant underlying concepts to 
the study are defined, such as ‘challenges’ or the distinction between ER and OO (following 
Holguín-Veras et al., 2012), in order to create an uniform understanding of the investigated 
subjects among interviewees. Third, the different contexts to be compared during the interviews 
are introduced. Inspired by the description of MSF’s practices at their Operational Center in 
Amsterdam, given by van der Laan et al. (2016), the authors have decided to ask interview 
participants to make an assessment of the criticality of challenges (discussed by themselves) in 
different contexts such as i) different regions/countries, ii) different cultures, iii) different sizes 
of operation (i.e. the number of involved actors), iv) different time elapsed since occurrence of 
the disaster (early/mid/late ER or OO) and v) different types of disasters (man-made vs. 
natural). Fourth, the interviewees’ role in the UNHCR Greece operation as well as their 
professional background (e.g. involvement in ER and OO operations) are requested in order to 
gain an impression of the participant’s ability to correctly assess different scenarios. Finally, 
the simplified Challenges Framework (Figure 8) is presented and interviewees are encouraged 
to select those areas (e.g. Funding & Donations, Demand Uncertainty) where they are currently 
experiencing / have experienced the most challenges throughout their career in the humanitarian 
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aid sector. This approach of letting participants set their own focus has been selected in order 
to use the limited timeslots, which staff members have cleared for participating in the 
interviews, most efficiently. 
Table 6: All Interviews Conducted during the In-Depth Field Study at UNHCR in Greece 
# Place & Time Title/Affiliation 
Involved 
in ER 
Involved 
in OO 
Years in 
HOP 
Type of 
Interview 
1. 
Athens, BO, 
21/03/2017 
Supply Officer 2 1 
3 years 
9 months 
Semi 
Structured 
2. 
Athens, BO, 
22/03/2017 
Senior Field Assistant 
(1) 
2 > 5 
> 10 
years 
Semi 
Structured 
3. 
Athens, 
Camp Schisto, 
28/03/2017 
Senior Field Assistant 
(2) 
3 0 4 years 
Semi 
Structured 
4. 
Athens, BO, 
29/03/2017 
Programme Officer 3 2 
14 years 
5 months 
Semi 
Structured 
5. 
Athens, BO, 
29/03/2017 
Senior Inter-Agency 
Coordination Assistant 
1 0 
1 year 
5 months 
Semi 
structured 
6. 
Athens, BO, 
29/03/2017 
Field Safety Advisor 5 1 
> 10 
years 
Semi 
structured 
7. 
Athens, BO, 
30/03/2017 
Supply/Procurement 
Assistant 
1 0 1 year 
Semi 
Structured 
8. 
Athens, FO, 
30/03/2017 
Senior Supply 
Assistant (1) 
1 0 9 months 
Semi 
Structured 
9. 
Athens, BO, 
30/03/2017 
Associate External 
Relations Officer 
3 1 
5 years 
4 months 
Semi 
Structured 
10. 
Athens, BO, 
30/03/2017 
Associate Programme 
Officer (Donor 
Relations) 
1 2 
Around 
8 Years 
Unstructured 
11. 
Athens, BO, 
30/03/2017 
Senior Supply 
Assistant (2) 
1 0 
1 year 
5 months 
Semi 
structured 
12. 
Athens, FO, 
31/03/2017 
Field Associate 1 0 
18 
months 
Semi 
Structured 
13. 
Athens, 
via Skype, 
03/04/2017 
Mental Health Activity 
Manager  
at Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) 
1 1 
Around 
18 
months 
Semi 
structured 
14. 
Thessaloniki, 
SO, 05/04/2017 
Senior Programme 
Assistant 
1 0 
1 year 
8 months 
Unstructured 
15. 
Athens, BO, 
05/04/2017 
Senior Technical 
Officer 
5 1 
Around 
8 Years 
Semi 
structured  
16. 
Athens, BO, 
07/04/2017 
Assistant 
Representative 
(Operations) Greece 
> 5 4 
> 10 
years 
Unstructured 
17. 
Athens, BO, 
07/04/2017 
Senior Supply Officer / 
Head of Supply Chain 
Greece 
> 5 2 
> 10 
years 
Semi  
Structured  
 
All the interviews in Table 6 have been conducted in Greece between the 21st of March and the 
7th of April 2017. Furthermore, nine of total seventeen interviews have been conducted by two 
interviewers, Johan Christofferson and Erik Müller. The remaining eight interviews have been 
split between both researchers in order to adapt to the sometimes overlapping interview 
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timeslots selected by the participants. All interviews except one have been performed face to 
face. The only exception is a semi-structured Skype interview. 
At this point, it should be emphasized once more, that due to the emergency character of the 
UNHCR Greece operation, staff members have only had limited time for interviews (between 
30 and 90 minutes) and their schedules have been subject to constant changes. Furthermore, a 
high share of staff members in the operation has been local (i.e. Greek) with some significant 
experience on the local labor market and the essential language skills to communicate with local 
implementing partners. However, the downside of this aspect lies in the fact that a significant 
amount of interviewees had not been involved in other operations than the one in Greece. 
Nevertheless, interviews have been conducted with both local and international staff in order to 
collect different biased and unbiased views, for example on the country of service (Greece) 
including local habits and peculiarities. This practice, of cross-referencing and comparing 
interview answers, has been of particular importance in order to better understand and classify 
statements, for example, about challenges related to the host government. Eventually, 59 
percent of all interviews have been conducted with international staff experienced in various 
ER and OO operations over many years. 
Direct Observations 
Direct observations of relevant behaviors or environmental conditions made in the natural 
setting of the case constitute another source of evidence (Yin, 2009). In that respect formal and 
casual observation approaches are distinguished. While formal activities comprise the 
purposeful participation or visit of an event (e.g. attending a meeting) with the intention to make 
observations, casual activities describe observations made in connection with another event 
(e.g. a field trip in order to conduct interviews) (ibid.). According to Yin (2009), observations 
are rarely used as stand-alone evidence but rather to support other data collection methods. Thus 
it mainly serves to create a better understanding of the context in which the phenomenon of 
investigation is encountered. Finally, the involvement and comparison of observations made by 
multiple researchers contributes decisively to the credibility of the observational evidence (Yin, 
2009). 
During the first days of the field study in Greece the focus of the authors has been on gaining 
an understanding of the UNHCR operation in the country. This included talking to personnel 
about their responsibilities and getting introduced to the different units such as Supply, 
Programme or Technical unit. Apart from that, the opportunity to visit the largest UNHCR 
stock in the Greece operation has arisen in the course of the first week in Greece. The authors 
have thus accompanied Supply Unit staff to a warehouses located in the outskirts of the Port of 
Pireaus holding 60 percent of all UNHCR relief stocks in the country worth around 3 million 
Euros (Supply Officer, UNHCR Greece, 2017). This field visit has made it possible to ask 
informal questions about supply-related procedures as well as making direct observations of 
the local warehouse operations. 
Apart from the “daily observations” on the corridors of a supranational HO, the authors have 
been given the opportunity to get an insight into selected events and locations. They have 
observed an internal training event for process compliance, visited refugee accommodations of 
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different kind and official status (i.e. official refugee camps including first hand experiences 
with local bureaucracy in order to be granted access and unofficial housing squats including 
skepticism about official institutions) and accompanied a group of senior officers on a two-day 
mission to camps in the Thessaloniki region. All major field visits and events are listed in the 
table below (Table 7). 
Table 7: Different Field Visits and Events Experienced during the Field Study in Greece 
# Place & Time Name of the Location or Event 
1. 
Athens, Port of Piraeus, 
14/03/2017 
UNHCR Warehouse 
Operated by 3PL (Kuehne+Nagel) 
2. 
Athens, BO, 
22/03/2017 
Supply Training for Administration Unit 
Hosted by Supply Unit Athens BO 
3. 
Western Athens region, 
28/03/2017 
Schisto Camp  
Present: UNHCR + NGOs + Greek military 
Operated by the Greek military.  
4. 
Athens city centre, 
29/03/2017 
Urban Areas, Occupied buildings (squats), 
Operated by anti-authoritarian/leftist groups 
5. 
Eastern Thessaloniki region,  
04/04/2017 
Camp Lagkadikia 
Present: UNHCR + DRC 
Operated by Danish Refugee Council (DRC) 
6. 
Northern Thessaloniki region, 
05/04/2017 
Camp Nea Kavala 
Present: ICRC+ UNHCR+ DRC 
Operated by the Greek military 
 
The observations made throughout the excursions have been perceived as extremely helpful 
during the interviews since they have enabled the authors to ask more relevant follow-up 
questions. Furthermore, the knowledge of the context has been valuable during later stages 
(analysis) when comparing and cross-referencing different results from the interviews. 
Questionnaire 
Self-completion questionnaires, like the one used for this study, are occasionally referred to as 
self-administered questionnaires, where the questionnaire is answered and completed by the 
respondents themselves. This is significantly different compared to structured interviews and 
since there is no interviewer to ask the questions, the questionnaire must be easy to follow and 
the questions easy to answer for the respondent (Bryman and Bell, 2015). The advantages of 
using this specific research method are that it is easy to send out in big quantities, it is easy for 
respondents to answer to it whenever they have time and it is also relatively cheap to 
administrate. These strengths usually outweigh the weaknesses of the method such as the 
inability to help respondents if they do not understand a question or the very limited possibilities 
to collect additional data (ibid.). Most self-completion questionnaires tend to be closed thus for 
example suggesting fixed answers in vertical or horizontal check boxes. These fixed answer 
alternatives can even follow a Likert scale (e.g. 1 to 7 as used in this study). This way of 
designing the questionnaire facilitates the processing of collected data in the subsequent data 
analysis (ibid.). 
Therefore, in order to find answers to RQ3 and to increase the understanding of the results from 
the interviews, a questionnaire has been developed and sent out to support this study. Other 
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than the interviews which have been used primarily to collect qualitative data, the questionnaire 
follows a quantitative approach with questions divided into different categories. The ranking is 
made by use of a 1 to 7 Likert scale. 
The questionnaire is structured according to the categories of the Challenges Framework 
(Figure 8) including a thirteenth category that has been identified during the trip to Greece 
(‘Community/Public’). Each of the thirteen categories is sub-divided into two sets of questions, 
one geared towards ER and the other towards OO operations. Both ER and OO sets consist of 
the same three questions. Based on their experience in the world of humanitarian aid, 
participants are asked to make an assessment of i) the probability of occurrence of category-
related challenges in ER/OO, ii) the (negative) impact of category-related challenges on ER/OO 
operations and iii) the probability to overcome category-related challenges or mitigate their 
negative impact in ER/OO. Figure 17 shows an example for the assessment of Personnel-related 
challenges in ER operations. 
 
Figure 17: Excerpt from Questionnaire (Full Questionnaire available in Appendix C) 
Furthermore, the participant’s level of experience in ER and OO is assessed by collecting 
individual information about i) the number of years working in humanitarian aid, ii) the number 
of ER operations involved in and iii) the number of OO operations involved in. In order to be 
considered in the final result, a respondent must have selected more than zero years of 
experience in any type of operation. Thus it is ensured that only those responses are included 
in the evaluation that have been given by practitioners with experience in both types of 
operations who therefore know about the differences between the respective requirements and 
challenges. 
The questionnaire has been sent to all 523 current members of the UNHCR Greece operation, 
the unit of analysis in this case. Due to the aforementioned high workload of the employees and 
the significant share of local resources in the operation with limited or no experience in OO, 
the response rate has been low with 19 valid answers. Nevertheless, the results are presented 
and analyzed in the following chapters (four and five) as the Challenges Assessment Framework 
(Figure 13) represents a new contribution to humanitarian logistics research which deserves the 
chance to be explained and illustrated by means of a concrete example. Beyond that, this 
research can be seen as a pilot study for further research in this field. 
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3.3 Data Analysis 
In this paragraph the process pursued during the analysis of the data and insights, which have 
been gathered in the course of the single case study in Greece, is explained. Aspects regarding 
the search and review of scientific literature, which constitutes the first phase of the Research 
Process (see Figure 19), have been discussed extensively in Chapter 2 and are therefore 
excluded from the explanations below. Hence, the data analysis activities described in this 
paragraph begin after the interviews with humanitarian practitioners have been conducted. 
When analyzing the data collected throughout a case study, researchers need to ensure that their 
analysis goes beyond the mere description and classification of observations. In fact, it is 
important to identify patterns and understand the underlying reasons and conditions for their 
existence (Miles and Huberman, 1994). One technique to be applied in this regard is Pattern 
Matching, as described by Yin (2009), where researchers compare empirical-based patterns 
with predicted patterns as for example identified in the course of the initial literature review 
(Yin, 2009). The following analysis approach has been pursued in this study: 
1) Comparing interview notes with audio records and summarizing all relevant information 
from each interview. Matching of discussed core challenges (CC) and RCCs to thirteen 
categories from the extended Challenges Framework (Figure 8 plus external 
‘Community/Public’ category, discussed in Chapter 4.1.2). 
2) Comparing all challenges discussed per category and identifying the set of two or three 
most commonly discussed CCs and respective RCCs for each category. Creating overview 
tables including those 21 internal and 17 external CCs, their RCCs and the interview 
partners addressing them (similar to Tables 10 and 12). 
3) Merging findings from interviews (overview tables as discussed before) with comparable 
findings from literature review. (Note: Not all findings from literature review could have 
been matched with interview findings. Therefore, the analysis builds on the findings from 
the case study, presented in Chapter 4, to ensure a structured comparison and assessment 
of challenges and their criticality in humanitarian operations.) Creating summary overview 
table including all relevant CCs, their RCCs, the interview partners (practitioners) and 
literature sources (authors) discussing them, their criticality in different contexts as 
perceived by interviewees and the solutions discussed by practitioners and literature (see 
Excel data file). 
4) Applying Challenges Framework to show interrelations of combined challenges  
from literature review and case study (Figure 24). 
5) Analyzing findings from questionnaire: Filtering out inappropriate responses given by 
respondents who have stated zero years of experience in either type of operation (ER/OO). 
6) Applying Challenges Assessment Framework to illustrate criticality of challenge categories 
(Figures 25 and 26). Comparing i) probability of occurrence, ii) (negative) impact on the 
operation and iii) probability to overcome category-related challenges or mitigate their 
negative impact in ER and OO operations. Computing Challenge Values for each challenge 
category. Creating two tables (ER/OO respectively) indicating the criticality of internal and 
external challenge categories and showing Challenge Value ranking (Tables 13 and 14). 
Thus, identifying the most critical challenge categories in ER and OO. 
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7) Applying UN/UNHCR risk management policies and tools to suggest strategies for 
addressing challenges according to their criticality levels (corresponds to Challenge Value 
computed in Step 6). 
 
3.4 Trustworthiness of the Research 
In this part, the aim is to present how the quality of research has been secured in this study. 
Validity and reliability are of particular importance in case study research. In this regard, the 
reliability of research lies in the ability to replicate it and in the degree to what the findings are 
independent from the accidental characteristics of the research, basically the trustworthiness of 
the data collection (Boesch et al., 2013). Thus, reliable research has to be repeatable by other 
researchers showing similar results. Research validity, in turn, is often divided into three 
dimensions, internal validity, construct validity and external validity. They are further 
explained in the left column of Table 8 below. Beyond that, the table describes how the 
reliability as well as the different dimensions of validity have been secured in four different 
phases of the study – when designing the study, when selecting the case, during the data 
gathering process and with regard to the data analysis. 
Table 8: Validity of the Study (modeled after Reuter et al., 2010) 
Validity and Reliability Addressed Throughout the Course of Research 
Reliability/Validity 
Criterion 
Research Phase 
Design Case Selection Data Gathering Data Analysis 
Reliability 
(demonstrating that the 
operations can be 
repeated, with the same 
results) 
Develop case study 
protocol.  
Selection of case 
based on an 
actual emergency 
operation which 
is clearly 
defined.  
Shared interview 
guide and material 
used during the 
interviews, shared 
questionnaire.  
Replicability. 
Insights from both literature and 
interviews have been compared. 
Moreover, the internal results 
from the interviews have been 
checked for patterns to identify 
similar answers. 
Internal Validity 
(establishing a causal 
relationship, whereby 
certain conditions are 
shown to lead to other 
conditions, as 
distinguished from 
spurious relationships) 
 N/A 
Accessibility to 
representable 
case 
 Possibility to 
gather valid data. 
Multiple 
informants used 
during the case 
study. 
Internal pattern matching for all 
interview results. Then 
triangulation and exploring 
patterns of the results with 
literature, observations and to 
some extent also with the 
questionnaire. 
Two authors analysing the data 
and constantly challenge the 
analysis. 
Construct Validity 
(establishing correct 
operational measures 
for the concepts being 
studied) 
Same definitions of 
constructs (e.g. ER/ 
OO), obtained from 
literature, used 
during whole study. 
N/A 
Triangulation of 
data collection: 
interviews, direct 
observations and 
questionnaire.   
Constraints identified in 
literature have been partly 
tested/verified/extended during 
interviews and with the 
questionnaire. 
External Validity 
(establishing a domain 
in which the study’s 
findings can be 
generalized) 
Same definitions of 
constructs, obtained 
from literature, 
used during whole 
study. 
A clear definition 
and explanation 
of the case is 
presented in 
Chapter 3.2.2. 
Comparison with 
earlier findings 
from literature.  
Presented 
interview guide 
and questionnaire. 
N/A 
 
In order to secure the trustworthiness of this predominantly qualitative study, the triangulation 
in data gathering has been essential. “By combining multiple observations, theories, methods 
and data sources, [researchers] can hope to overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from single-
methods, single-observations, and single-theory studies” (Patton, 2002, p.555). Figure 18 by 
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Yin (2009) explains the importance of triangulation in data collection to increase the 
trustworthiness of results in case study research. According to Yin (2009), addressing multiple 
sources of evidence creates the ability to do multiple measures of the same phenomenon. The 
realization of triangulation in this study can be retraced in Chapter 3.2.4 and also in Table 8. 
 
Figure 18: Convergence of Multiple Sources of Evidence (Yin, 2009) 
 
3.5 Research Process 
 
 
Figure 19: Overview of Research Process (Christofferson and Müller, 2017) 
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4. Findings from the In-Depth Field Study with UNHCR in Greece 
In this chapter, the research findings obtained during the field study with UNHCR in Greece 
are presented in a structured way that allows the reader to comprehend which results have been 
generated from the interviews, observations and from the questionnaire. In the first section, the 
findings from the interviews and observations related to the Challenges Framework (Figure 8) 
are discussed. The internal and external part of the framework are presented separately thus 
providing detailed explanations of selected core challenges (CC) as well as the related root 
causes obtained from 17 interviews where over 160 challenges have been discussed in total. In 
the second section, the findings related to the Challenges Assessment Framework (Figure 13) 
are presented. They have been obtained from an online questionnaire, sent to UNHCR 
practitioners involved in the Greece operation, and are presented in two bar diagrams indicating 
internal and external challenge categories respectively. 
4.1 Interview Findings and Observations related to the Challenges Framework 
To begin with, it has to be remarked that during the interviews the response rate for accurate 
assessments of challenge criticality in different contexts – especially natural vs. man-made 
disasters – has been comparatively low overall. The reason for this lies predominantly in the 
aforementioned lack of experience in different contexts among a considerable number of 
interviewees. Furthermore, time limitations during the interview sessions (still emergency 
situation in Greece) have led to a certain neglect of different contexts in order to collect more 
challenges, gain a deeper understanding of interrelations and focus on the distinction of ER and 
OO as the main purpose of this study. Apart from that, the following insights have been 
collected throughout interviews and observations conducted during the case study in Greece. 
They are summarized and visualized in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Overview of Interview Findings (Christofferson and Müller, 2017) 
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Figure 20 shows the different challenge categories both internal and external to HOs and the 
SCs they operate in. The twelve categories introduced in Chapter 2 of this report have been 
amended by a thirteenth category (Community/Public) in order to include potential influences 
of the host community and public opinion leaders such as the media into the analysis. For each 
category two or three CCs have been identified and encoded with a letter-number combination 
(e.g. Personnel: A1, A2 and A3). All identified CCs and a number of underlying RCCs internal 
to the SC are presented and described in Table 10, while the CCs and RCCs related to the 
external environment can be found in Table 12. 
An observation that has been made during the course of the interviews is, that twice as much 
challenges have been discussed with regard to HOs and the SCs they operate in (i.e. internal) 
compared to the external environment of humanitarian operations. This becomes apparent when 
comparing Tables 9 and 11 presented in the beginning of Chapters 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 respectively. 
4.1.1 Challenges internal to HOs and the SCs they operate in 
Table 9 provides an overview of the seven internal challenge categories identified in 
Chapter 2. Beyond that, the number of challenges discussed per category as well as the number 
of interviewees discussing them are compared. The fourth column gives information about the 
official job titles of interviewees discussing the respective challenge category in the 
organization. 
A total of 109 challenges internal to HOs and the SCs they operate in have been discussed. It 
has to be noted, however, that the cumulated number of 109 challenges discussed among the 
seven internal categories does not mean that all of them are completely different and 
independent from each other. Hence, in many cases different interviewees have been discussing 
a set of largely similar challenges with regard to the same challenge category, sometimes using 
different examples or discussing them in different contexts. However, after a thorough 
comparison of all challenges discussed per category, the authors have identified the set of three 
CCs – including their underlying RCCs – that have been discussed by most interviewees for 
each internal category. They are presented in Table 10. Beyond that, a detailed explanation of 
all categories, including selected challenges, is given below. The same process has been pursued 
for external challenge categories and is presented in Chapter 4.1.2. 
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Table 9: Overview of Internal Challenge Categories covered during Interviews 
Category 
Number of 
Challenges 
discussed 
Number of 
Interviewees 
discussing 
Challenges 
Practitioner Job Titles in the Organization 
Personnel 16 7 
Field Safety Advisor; Programme Officer; Assistant Representative 
(Ops); Mental Health Activity Manager (MSF); Snr. Programme 
Assistant; Snr. Supply Assistant (2); Supply/Procurement Assistant  
Information 
Systems 
9 3 
Supply Officer; Snr. Technical Officer; Snr. Field Assistant (2); Snr. 
Programme Assistant 
Internal 
Integration 
9 7 
Snr. Field Assistant (2); Mental Health Activity Manager (MSF); 
Associate External Relations Officer; Snr. Supply Assistant (1); Snr. 
Supply Assistant (2); Associate Programme Officer (Donor 
Relations); Supply/Procurement Assistant 
External 
Integration 
21 8 
Field Safety Advisor; Assistant Representative (Ops); Snr. Field 
Assistant (1); Mental Health Activity Manager (MSF); Snr. 
Programme Assistant; Snr. Supply Assistant (2); Snr. Supply 
Assistant (1); Snr. Inter-Agency Coordination Assistant 
Processes & 
Standard 
Procedures 
10 6 
Snr. Technical Officer; Field Safety Advisor; Assistant 
Representative (Ops); Mental Health Activity Manager (MSF); 
Associate External Relations Officer; Snr. Supply Assistant (2) 
Funding & 
Donations 
28 10 
Supply Officer; Programme Officer; Assistant Representative (Ops); 
Snr. Field Assistant (1); Mental Health Activity Manager (MSF); 
Associate External Relations Officer; Snr. Supply Assistant (1); 
Associate Programme Officer (Donor Relations); Snr. Inter-Agency 
Coordination Assistant; Supply/Procurement Assistant  
Demand 
Uncertainty 
16 9 
Supply Officer; Snr. Technical Officer; Field Safety Advisor; 
Programme Officer; Assistant Representative (Ops); Mental Health 
Activity Manager (MSF); Snr. Supply Assistant (2); Snr. Inter-
Agency Coordination Assistant; Supply/Procurement Assistant  
 
Personnel 
In this category a total of 16 challenges have been discussed by seven different interviewees. 
Among them, the CC “high level of personal stress” (A1). Six different practitioners have 
stated the negative effects of stress that humanitarian workers are exposed to during an 
operation. Observations that have been made in the open-plan office at UNHCR in Athens 
throughout several occasions also support the insight that humanitarian workers are exposed to 
diverse stressful situations which not everyone can handle equally well. 
The perception of a high level of personal stress among humanitarian workers is not really 
surprising since they are working in an emergency response situation where a constant high 
quality of work is expected from them in view of demand uncertainty and only very limited 
response time. Other reasons (thus root causes, RCC) for personal stress lie in the uncertainty 
about the own future. Short-term contracts for employment in HOs that only last for several 
months thus complicating the forward planning in terms as simple as “Where am I going to live 
in three months? Will I be able to sign a rental agreement with such short terms and periods of 
notice? Will I be able to bring my family? Where do we live and will my children have to change 
school every six months?” have been discussed repeatedly. Apart from that, an expat 
humanitarian worker’s residential status in the country of service also often depends on the 
duration of their employment. When the employment ends, the expat worker usually has to 
leave the country. However, even during their assignment in the crisis region, expats might face 
significant administrative hurdles, especially when their work permission / visa has been issued 
inappropriately by local authorities thus requiring expats to periodically leave and re-enter the 
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country of service. Aspects like this also contribute to a perceived uncertainty about the 
personal future which can create high levels of stress for an individual and eventually effect the 
work this person is entrusted with to support the operation. 
Finally, personal stress can also have its cause in a lack of confidence regarding communication 
with other actors involved in the humanitarian operation – partners, local authorities or 
beneficiaries. In this context, lack of individual problem solving skills as well as language 
barriers can have a significant negative impact. The latter can cause problems when helping 
POCs, if humanitarian workers are not able to properly explain what they (can) do to help or 
what rights POCs have. Even translators are not always able to understand and speak every 
regional dialect of a people – a problem that has been observed during several field visits. This 
can create stress for both the humanitarian worker and the POC. In the worst case, the stress on 
the part of the POCs might turn into aggression and violence against humanitarian workers. 
Information Systems 
One Information Systems-related challenge discussed by four different humanitarian 
professionals is the “unclear description of (non-food) items in the ERP-system catalogue” 
(B3). The difficulty lies in keeping track of available supplies such as the type of supplies and 
the number of items available on stock per product. In this context the example of a European 
textile corporation has been discussed during several interviews. This company had donated a 
large amount of clothes to UNHCR in Greece for distribution to POCs arriving from the Middle 
East. Unfortunately, UNHCR could not make good use of those in-kind donations. 
“[…] I think one big reason was due to technical challenges, the ERP-system. In our 
ERP-system, when we are tracking the different donated items, it should be very much 
accurate and relate to what really is existing physically in the warehouse.” 
Supply Officer, UNHCR Greece, 2017 
When entering all donations into the tracking system for accountability purposes, specific in-
kind purchase orders (POs) need to be prepared electronically in order to track the donated 
items appropriately. Referring back to the example of the clothing items donated by the 
European textile corporation, the following mistake has been made (simplified example). 
Among others, 300 items have been donated to meet the needs of female POCs: 100 pairs of 
trousers, 100 shirts and 100 scarfs. When entering the donation into the system, three separate 
lines have been created in the corresponding PO in compliance with the PO process. However, 
the different products (trousers, shirts and scarfs) have been mistakenly stored under the same 
product ID and product description “women clothes” in the ERP-system instead of creating a 
new product ID for every new line. Consequently, when creating a stock report all three lines 
characterized by one identical product ID and description add up to one line indicating “300 
units of women clothes” available on stock. Meanwhile no member of Supply unit has been able 
to tell with certainty how many trousers, shirts and scarfs have been on stock ready for 
distribution. 
“Everyone is now wondering what is this ‘women clothes’?” 
Supply Officer, UNHCR Greece, 2017 
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With this as an example, it becomes apparent how much impact this challenge can have on the 
operation. In the actual case the donation has been significantly larger than 300 units. The 
identified root causes to this challenge appear twofold. First, the time pressure aspect during an 
emergency response situation induces humanitarian workers to hastily enter newly arrived in-
kind donations into the ERP-system in order to immediately indicate their availability thereby 
causing such careless mistakes. The second potential RCC describes a more critical deficit 
internal to the organization. An overall silo thinking mentality, manifested in a lack of “supply 
thinking” in other units, can lead to the aforementioned inefficient management of in-kind 
donations. For example, the profound knowledge about how supplies and/or donations need to 
be processed in order to be seamlessly integrated into the ERP-system is essential for units 
responsible for fundraising. Better knowledge about the process allows them to assess the value 
of promised donations before the physical delivery to the HO warehouse(s). If the use of a 
donation appears minimal but comes with considerable organizational effort, these units might 
even reject a donation in exceptional cases. 
Internal Integration 
To this category nine challenges have been discussed by seven different practitioners during 
the interviews. One of them is the perceived “significant re-work / extra work required from 
executing units (e.g. Supply) during late stages of a process (e.g. procurement)” (C2). This 
challenge appears to be of high topicality since it has been addressed by numerous interviewees. 
Beyond that, it has been the occasion for a multi-hour training seminar that the authors have 
attended at UNHCR’s Athens BO (branch office) on 22 March 2017. The seminar, which has 
been arranged and hosted by Supply unit, was aimed at explaining supply processes (i.e. the 
procurement process) and demonstrating responsibilities throughout the process to colleagues 
from other units (in this case Administration unit) thus the requestors of a service. It has been 
part of a series of training events with the aim of increasing the overall understanding of supply 
processes and the significant share of requestor responsibilities (especially with regard to 
product specifications) in order to achieve higher process compliance. Non-compliance with 
existing processes, usually arising from the aforementioned silo thinking phenomenon 
characterized by a lack of awareness for other colleagues’ work procedures, can lead to leaving 
out or lapsing important preparatory steps (e.g. technical evaluation). This causes significant 
extra-work for both Supply unit and the requesting unit which would have to re-work their 
request in order to meet the process requirements. Another form of process non-compliance lies 
in the circumvention of prescribed procedures and entities, for example when making contact 
with potential suppliers. This constitutes a particular delicate stage in the procurement process 
of any HO. HOs are usually spending money that has been donated by private or governmental 
donors (i.e. taxpayer money). Because of that, they are obliged to follow strict rules and 
procedures in terms of transparency and accountability. In order to ensure maximum 
correctness in this regard, requestors are not allowed to make direct contact with potential 
suppliers. Instead, the order must be tendered publicly by a central department – the Supply unit 
in the case of UNHCR. In this way collusions and the risk of corruptibility of humanitarian 
workers can be largely avoided and the spending of donated money on the most competitive 
bid is assured. This “detour” through Supply unit apparently has the potential to slow down the 
process from the viewpoint of the requestor which is why process non-compliance is an issue 
particularly in ER operations when the speed of deliveries is crucial. 
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Apart from that, it has become apparent that different units within the organization are unaware 
of the high share of responsibilities they have along the (procurement) process. Contrary to the 
general assumption that sees Supply in charge of almost the entire process and its related sub 
steps, Supply only handle around 50 percent of all tasks while important preparatory work, such 
as the aforementioned definition of product specifications or its technical evaluation, falls 
within the competence of the requesting units and departments. Hence, this situation is a clear 
example for challenges regarding coordination, collaboration and communication among units 
within an organization. 
External Integration 
With regard to External Integration, eight out of seventeen interviewees have discussed a total 
of 21 challenges. Besides problems caused by local implementing partners or the general 
duplication of activities, leading to waste of resources and unmet needs in other areas of 
concern, the most commonly mentioned challenge relates to the host government. More 
specifically, to the “lack of government coordination of relief actors and efforts” (D1).  
According to the interviewed practitioners, this challenge on the one hand stems from a general 
uncertainty about the overall coordination responsibility. Normally, the coordination on 
country-level is done by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) which consists of a 
Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), who is a qualified professional in the country approved by 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). In many cases the HC is the current UN Resident 
Coordinator in charge of coordinating the development efforts of all UN bodies in a country 
who is also accredited by the host government. Moreover, the UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and further organizations with a significant operational 
relevance for the in-country relief-efforts are involved in the HCT. Even the host government 
and donors might be invited to participate in the HCT (Building a Better Response, 2014). This 
forum jointly leads the relief efforts in the affected country. However, in the Greece operation 
the situation is different. UNHCR and other UN agencies such as UNICEF are not granted any 
official status in the country by the host government. Therefore, their abilities to take over 
coordination responsibility are extremely restricted. Although UNHCR, unlike the Greek 
government, has experience in handling large-scale refugee crises, the government in Athens 
prefers to claim full control of all decisions on Greek sovereign territory. However, as already 
mentioned, it lacks both the experience and human/financial resources required to appropriately 
execute the control and coordination functions. The result is a partly inadequate coordination 
of the multiple relief actors involved in the country and their joint efforts to alleviate human 
suffering. 
Another challenge related to area of External Integration has been observed by the authors 
during a field-trip to a UNHCR warehouse outside Athens. As UNHCR procure large amounts 
of different products for distribution to POCs, a lot of contracts have to be negotiated and 
signed. It is therefore important to maintain a clear and regular communication with the 
different suppliers. The observed case, however, demonstrates the negative effects of a deficient 
communication thus leading to cumbersome and time-consuming double handling of activities 
in order to correct the initial mistake (compare D2). In this particular case, UNHCR had ordered 
a larger quantity of “Baby Care Kits” from a supplier in Jordan. The kits contained a pack of 
20 diapers, a tube of wound-healing cream and wet wipes, all packed in handy green bags as 
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shown in Figure 21. After delivery to UNHCR’s central warehouse outside Athens, Supply unit 
has carried out a random sample inspection of kits shipped on different pallets. A representative 
result of this inspection is presented in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21: UNHCR Baby Care Kits (personal photographs (Müller, 2017)) 
The majority of examined kits contained torn diaper packages. The reason for this has become 
apparent when comparing the order placed by UNHCR with the original quantity of diapers 
indicated on the package. While UNHCR had placed an order for 20 pieces per “Baby Care 
Kit” the supplier had access to pre-packed diapers in quantities of 22 pieces per unit. However, 
instead of clarifying with UNHCR whether the additional two diapers per unit would be 
purchased as well in order to maintain the integrity of the sealed package, the supplier decided 
to strictly comply with the contract and removed two diapers from each unit by tearing them 
open and sending the torn packages to Greece. UNHCR representatives have stated that the 
organization would have accepted the additional two diapers without hesitation in order to 
guarantee the hygiene of the products as well as their swift delivery (since no additional 
handling would have been required to re-pack and seal the diapers). The delivered kits including 
torn packages, however, have been unacceptable for UNHCR. Not only because of hygienic 
reasons, but also in order to avoid negative media coverage in the event that it became known 
that UNHCR distributes substandard relief items to infants in need. For this reason and because 
of the significant size of the defective sample, UNHCR have decided to reject the whole 
shipment. The supplier had to collect all pallets from the Athens warehouse, control every single 
unit and replace/re-pack damaged packages before sending them back to Greece – at their own 
expense. This double-handling has cost the supplier additional money, thus reducing their 
profit, and UNHCR time until distribution of the “Baby Care Kits”. 
Processes and Standard Procedures 
The most commonly cited challenge related to Processes and Standard Procedures during the 
interviews has been a “lack of process compliance” which humanitarian workers experience in 
their daily work. However, as this challenge is also very much related to aspects of Internal 
Integration, it has already been elaborated under this paragraph. Beyond that, the “hyper-
formalization of procedures and formalities” (E3) stands out among the remaining challenges 
that have been discussed in this context. 
Hyper-formalization of procedures and formalities is a result of the high overall public and 
media attention for the operation and the HOs involved in it. This applies in particular for ER 
situations, when the media presence in the disaster area is high, although it has also been 
assessed challenging in protracted operations (i.e. OO) by interviewees. Humanitarian 
practitioners have emphasized the high level of bureaucracy within HOs especially with regard 
to transparency, documentation and certification which is strongly encouraged by donors. 
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Donors seek to receive as detailed information as possible about the projects their donated 
money is used for. Thus, in order to avoid spending money on more expensive or even dubious 
suppliers and to reduce the risk of corruptibility, which might result in negative media coverage 
regarding both HOs and donors, HOs are required to work as accurate as possible by 
documenting every decision. Donor pressure can therefore be considered the main driver of 
over-accurate thus hyper-formalized procedures and documentation in HOs making routine 
work more complex and time-consuming. 
Funding and Donations 
Funding and Donations-related challenges have been among the two most extensively 
discussed categories throughout the case study, together with Political Governance. However, 
it has to be noted that the challenges discussed in this context diverge widely in terms of content. 
While some interviewees have addressed the general uncertainty on the part of field workers 
regarding the mere existence and availability of funding (F1) (e.g. Programme Officer, 
UNHCR Greece, 2017), others have reported on the low usability of too much, yet 
inappropriate in-kind donations (F2) (e.g. Snr. Inter-Agency Coordination Assistant, UNHCR 
Greece, 2017). A prominent example for this, repeatedly stated by UNHCR practitioners in the 
Greece operation, has been the aforementioned case of a European textile corporation donating 
too revealing women’s apparel for distribution to female POCs of Muslim faith. The underlying 
root cause to this challenge suggests a general lack of donor awareness of cultural differences 
in the needs of POCs. 
Another aspect that is perceived as very challenging by humanitarian practitioners is the 
influence of some large-scale donors on the selection of projects at organizations they fund and 
on the allocation of money they provide (F3). While the latter is usually pursued through the 
common practice of earmarked funding, the influence on operational decisions of HOs is 
normally rarer. In the Greece operation, however, the two main donors are particularly 
powerful. In 2016 the European Commission has contributed around 90 percent of UNHCR’s 
budget through its departments for civil protection and humanitarian aid operations (ECHO) 
and migration and home affairs (DG Home). 
“[In the beginning] UNHCR set its own plan, its own strategy and fund-raised for this. 
But [in March 2016] the situation completely changed – with the EU-Turkey Statement 
and the closure of the border – and the donors were very much involved […] not only on 
the ground but also with the [Greek] government itself. […] ECHO took a role which was 
very much the role of an agency leading the response in Greece and also influencing very 
much what the humanitarian actors were supposed to do. […] This was – as a 
fund-raiser – very much of a challenge, to make sure that we had activities which were 
first what we wanted to do and what we thought as UNHCR was important to do. But also 
what the donor wanted us to do.” 
Associate Programme Officer (Donor Relations), UNHCR Greece, 2017 
The strong influence of few donors has been explained by three underlying factors (RCCs). 
First, the absence of a broad funding base with only a very limited number of major, large-
scale contributors to the organization/operation leads to some sort of “donor monopoly” with 
a strong negotiating position on the donor side. 
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Second, the political or economic interest of donors in the crisis region. While some 
commercial donors pursue a humanitarian engagement within the scope of their Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) goals in order to eventually improve their reputation which, in turn, 
potentially impacts their revenues, other governmental donors such as the European 
Commission follow a political agenda. Greece is an EU member state that is suffering from a 
severe financial crisis with a high unemployment rate, low salaries and pensions and massive 
debt to the EU which is both the administrative supranational umbrella organization and main 
contributor to humanitarian relief efforts in the country. Therefore, the European Commission 
seeks to fund projects that not only support POCs but preferably also contribute to the 
stabilization of the Greek state. 
Third, in doing so, the donor (here European Commission) itself is exposed to strict supervision 
(thus pressure) from the media and national parliaments of the member states as the provided 
money to humanitarian aid in Greece is European taxpayer money. Hence, even donors are 
often committed to transparency regarding the activities they support and pass on this 
commitment to their implementing partners. 
Demand Uncertainty 
Most of the challenges discussed with regard to Demand Uncertainty in humanitarian 
operations appear to be related to the fact (and challenge) that the assessment of demand is 
different in humanitarian SCs compared to commercial SCs (G3). Nine interviewed 
practitioners have described an overall lack of planning and demand forecasting – especially 
on project or field level (G1). The main reason (thus RCC) discussed for this is the significant 
volatility of external circumstances in crisis situations. The uncertainty and volatility regarding 
the number of POCs arriving in the country (or region) compared to their movements both 
within and outward the country complicate the assessment of how much is needed of what sort 
of items in what place and for how long. In addition, the unpredictability about the temporal 
expansion of a crisis (long-term/short-term) further increases the difficulties in the 
determination of needs (e.g. summer or winter supplies needed for shelter and clothing). 
Finally, slow decision-making processes on the part of the host government, seeking to control 
all activities without having sufficient capacities (see External Integration), as well as long 
delivery lead-times to often remote crisis regions with poorly developed infrastructure need to 
be considered in demand assessments to bridge these time gaps. 
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Table 10: Internal Challenges discussed during Interviews in Greece 
Category # Challenge Root Cause 
No. of 
People 
P
er
so
n
n
el
 
A1 
High level of personal 
stress 
- Uncertainty about personal future (employment) negatively affects personal 
   commitment to projects 
- Short-term contracts (months) for employment in HOs 
- Uncertainty regarding personal legal status in country of service ( issuance of 
   inappropriate business permits for expat staff members that need to be renewed 
   frequently by leaving and re-entering the country of service) 
- Lack of confidence in areas like communication (official communication and 
   with POCs) and problem solving skills 
- Meet the expectations to deliver high quality work in view of demand 
   uncertainty and lack of response time 
- Aggressions towards (field) personnel and general security risks faced in crisis 
   regions 
6 
A2 
Lack of experienced staff 
in humanitarian operations 
- Difficulties and delays in bringing the "right" international staff (e.g. Arab staff 
   when Arab refugees involved) into the country of service 
- Lengthy visa processes if UN Laissez-Passer (UNLP) is not available 
- No permanent work permits for expat staff ( expats not coming at all or 
   frequently leaving to renew business permit) 
- Staff of some nationality/religious group not welcome / not allowed to enter 
   different countries (e.g. American citizens or people of Jewish confession in 
   some Arab states) 
- Lack of (organization specific) training 
- Inappropriate recruiting strategies  experience often more important than 
   diplomas and certificates 
6 
A3 
Loss of information and 
(experience-based) 
knowledge 
High staff turnover rates ( including also exchange of supervisors) due to 
short-term/temporary contracts in HOs 
3 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 S
y
st
em
s 
B1 
Conflicting information: 
Same aspects discussed 
with different results 
depending on the issuing 
party (e.g. number of camp 
inhabitants different 
according to police vs. 
NGOs) 
- All parties (donor, host government, HOs) have own interests (political/ 
   economical) and often want their own numbers to support this interest 
   (e.g. very high // very low numbers) 
- Goal: attract more funding 
3 
B2 
Over-reporting: Too many 
reports and too much detail 
("Reporting for reporting") 
- Donor pressure to constantly provide detailed reports – but no clear definition 
   how to report 
- Inconsistent reporting standards between different donors (i.e. no standard 
   template) 
- Donors themselves being under pressure/supervision from superordinate 
   authorities or media – especially when distributing taxpayer money 
3 
B3 
Unclear description of 
(Non-Food) Items in ERP-
system catalogue (e.g. 
"women clothes" as one 
position with one ID) 
 Difficulties to keep track 
of available supplies (type 
of supplies and number of 
items on stock per product) 
- Hasty entry of in-kind donations into ERP-system to indicate availability 
- Silo thinking: lack of "supply thinking" in other units (e.g. fundraising) 
    Lack of knowledge how supplies/donations need to be processed for 
        seamless integration into ERP-system 
4 
In
te
rn
a
l 
In
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 
C1 
Internal incomprehension 
and frustration in the 
organization 
- Organization's budget depending on the region 
- Willingness to donate higher when crisis enters wealthy communities (e.g. 
   European Union) 
- High budget for low number of POCs (e.g. Europe) compared to other 
   operations by the same organization in different regions where humanitarian 
   workers of the same HO have to work with much lower resources for higher 
   numbers of POCs 
2 
C2 
Significant re-work/extra 
work required from 
executing units (e.g. 
Supply) during late 
stage of a process (e.g. 
procurement) 
- Silo thinking: lack of awareness for other colleagues' work procedures leads to 
   leaving out or lapsing important preparatory steps (e.g. product specification/ 
   technical evaluation) 
- Non-compliance with existing processes (e.g. procurement) 
(- Unclarity about roles/responsibilities of other units within the same 
   organization)  see 1st point 
5 
C3 
Difficulties in 
having/maintaining a 
common and constant 
culture within the 
organization 
High staff turnover rates 2 
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Table 10 continued 
Category # Challenge Root Cause 
No. of 
People 
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
In
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 
D1 
Lack of government 
coordination of relief 
actors and efforts 
- Unclear coordination responsibility 
- Lack of preparedness for large refugee crises on national (e.g. Greece) and 
   supra-national (e.g. EU) level 
- Lack of host government capacities and capabilities while concurrently seeking 
   to be in full control 
5 
D2 
Duplication of activities 
leading to waste of 
resources and unmet needs 
in other areas of concern 
Lack of coordination among humanitarian and other implementing partners 3 
D3 
Lack of experienced (local) 
implementing partners 
- No experience with humanitarian crisis situations 
- Language barriers 
- Low budget / different budgets among implementing partners 
- High level of bureaucracy at HOs regarding transparency, documentation and 
   certification ( high level of detail) 
- Assignment of local implementing partners through government officials not 
   based on competence but personal relationships 
4 
P
ro
ce
ss
es
 &
 
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 P
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
E1 
Indirect communication 
procedures 
- Unclarity about roles/responsibilities of other units within the same organization 
- Units speak too complicated between each other  functional silos (silo 
   thinking within HO) 
3 
E2 
Lack of process 
compliance (e.g. 
procurement process) 
- Involvement and coordination of multiple instances between order on 
   project/field-level and delivery to regional warehouse 
- Long supply/delivery lead-times 
- Length of processes 
- High level of bureaucracy within HO regarding transparency, documentation 
   and certification to comply with donor requirements ( high level of detail) 
- Lack of awareness in humanitarian world that Standard Operating Procedures 
   (SOPs) really make work life easier 
5 
E3 
Hyper-formalization of 
procedures and formalities 
- Public and media attention 
- High level of bureaucracy within HO regarding transparency, documentation 
   and certification to comply with donor requirements ( high level of detail) 
3 
F
u
n
d
in
g
 &
 D
o
n
a
ti
o
n
s 
F1 
Uncertainty about 
availability of funding 
- High-level negotiations and decision-making between HO and donor(s) 
    late information to unit/field level employees 
- Competition among humanitarian actors for the same donor money 
    decreasing funding while needs are increasing and more and more actors 
        are getting involved 
- Announcement of US government to significantly reduce contribution to 
humanitarian aid 
4 
F2 
Inappropriate in-kind 
donations 
- Lack of donor awareness for cultural differences in the needs of POCs 
   (e.g. too revealing clothes for Muslim women) 
- Lack of donor awareness for lifestyle, culture and law in the receiving country 
   (e.g. condom distribution to male prison to prevent HIV spread in country 
    where homosexuality is illegal) 
3 
F3 
High donor influence on 
project selection and 
money allocation (e.g. 
through earmarked 
funding) 
- Very limited number of (large-scale) donors to the organization/operation 
   ("donor monopoly") 
- Political/economic interest of donor(s) in the crisis region 
- Donors themselves being under pressure/supervision from superordinate 
   authorities or media – especially when distributing taxpayer money 
4 
D
em
a
n
d
 U
n
ce
rt
a
in
ty
 
G1 
Lack of planning / demand 
forecasting (especially on 
project/field level) 
- Volatility of external circumstances 
- High level of bureaucracy (lengthy/cumbersome ordering process) 
   within the HO 
- Long delivery lead-times 
- Slow government decision-making process 
9 
G2 
Uncertainty about how 
much of what sort of items 
is needed where and for 
how long 
- Volatility of external circumstances 
- Handover of projects 
7 
G3 
Uncertainty and assessment 
of demand differ largely 
between humanitarian SCs 
and commercial SCs 
Volatility of external circumstances: 
   volatility of POC influx 
   volatility of POC movements (in the country, leaving the country) 
   volatility of requirements (long-term/short-term; winter/summer) 
6 
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4.1.2 Challenges external to HOs and the SCs they operate in 
Similar to Table 9, Table 11 below provides an overview of the five external challenge 
categories identified in Chapter 2. Beyond that, they have been complemented by a sixth 
category, Community/Public (see M1, M2 and M3 in Table 12), that has been identified during 
the case study. Furthermore, the number of challenges discussed per category as well as the 
number of interviewees discussing them are compared. The fourth column gives information 
about the official job titles of interviewees discussing the respective challenge category. 
A total of 54 challenges emanating from the external environment of humanitarian operations 
have been discussed during the interviews conducted in Greece. Again, the set of three CCs and 
various underlying RCCs that have been addressed most commonly are presented for each 
category. The only exception to this are Infrastructure-related challenges. Due to the extremely 
small number of challenges discussed in this category, the authors have been unable to derive 
three individual CCs. Hence, only two CCs are presented (L1 and L2) in Table 12. 
Table 11: Overview of External Challenge Categories covered during Interviews 
Category 
Number of 
Challenges 
discussed 
Number of 
Interviewees 
discussing 
Challenges 
Practitioner Job Titles in the Organization 
Physical 
Elements of 
Disaster 
Environment 
4 3 Supply Officer; Supply/ Procurement Assistant; Field Safety Advisor 
Socio-
Economical 
8 5 
Snr. Technical Officer; Supply/ Procurement Assistant; Snr. Supply 
Assistant (1); Mental Health Activity Manager (MSF); Field Safety 
Advisor 
Political 
Governance 
24 10 
Field Safety Advisor; Supply/Procurement Assistant; Snr. Inter-
Agency Coordination Assistant; Associate Programme Officer 
(Donor Relations); Snr. Supply Assistant (1); Associate External 
Relations Officer; Mental Health Activity Manager (MSF); Assistant 
Representative (Ops); Snr. Programme Assistant; Snr. Supply 
Assistant (2) 
Security 10 5 
Supply Officer; Snr. Field Assistant (2); Snr. Technical Officer; Snr. 
Supply Assistant (1); Field Safety Advisor 
Infrastructure 4 3 
Mental Health Activity Manager (MSF); Assistant Representative 
(Ops); Snr. Field Assistant (2) 
Community/ 
Public 
4 4 
Associate Programme Officer (Donor Relations); Snr. Inter-Agency 
Coordination Assistant; Snr. Field Assistant (1); Associate External 
Relations Officer 
 
The most extensively discussed category by far is Political Governance, with 24 challenges 
addressed by 10 different interviewees. This represents almost half of the discussed challenges 
for the external categories. In contrast to that, Physical Elements of the Disaster Environment 
and Infrastructure-related problems and disruptions have been mentioned by less than 17 
percent of interviewed practitioners. The new category Community/Public has been added to 
the framework due to corresponding observations that have been made during a field-trip to 
unofficial urban refugee housing in Athens (squats) and discussions with UNHCR Field 
Associates engaged in this environment. All six categories including selected examples are 
explained below. 
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Physical Elements of Environment 
Challenges related to this category have been among the least commonly addressed issues 
throughout the case study with no more than four references by three practitioners. Originally 
intended to cover problems caused by extreme weather conditions or topographical 
characteristics of the crisis region that might affect its accessibility, only few of those aspects 
have been touched during some interviews. In all of these cases, however, extreme weather has 
played an important role. During the winter 2016/2017 both HOs and the Greek government 
have been surprised by the fiercest winter in many years which had come with persistent sub-
zero temperatures and snowfall – even on the Aegean Islands – causing several casualties 
among POCs. Atypical weather phenomena in the crisis region, such as snowfall on the Greek 
islands, have been described as main root cause (RCC) for the spontaneous, unforeseen need 
for specific products and measures that are usually not prepared or pre-positioned in the region 
(H1) thus demanding short-term creative solutions. In the Greece operation this has meant to 
procure large quantities of heaters as well as weatherproof shelter (e.g. containers) and to 
distribute them all over the country in a short time. 
In contrast to that, another interviewee has pointed out to the detention of shelter material (i.e. 
tent fabric) (H2) during summer months due to the sustained exposure to extreme sunlight, dust 
and low air humidity. Such extreme deviations between the weather conditions in the same 
region further complicate the selection of appropriate shelter and relief items, especially in light 
of uncertainty about the duration of the crisis. 
Socio-Economical 
Socio-Economical challenges in a humanitarian operation emerge from the interrelation of 
economic activity and social customs practiced in the society of the disaster region. Since the 
concept of socioeconomics in general leaves a lot of room for interpretation, practitioners have 
not been particularly consistent when discussing challenges in this regard. Therefore, no more 
than three explicit CCs have been derived from the interviews. 
First, the socio-economical imbalance between local and international implementing partners 
within the same operation that leads to envy and mutual incomprehension (I3). The main 
reasons for this (RCCs) are usually the unequal working conditions among relief workers. Local 
staff, employed by local or governmental implementing partners, reportedly receive lower 
salaries less frequently than expats employed by international HOs – even for doing the same 
work. Furthermore, local staff is often accommodated under poorer conditions compared to 
their expat counterparts at international HOs. 
Second, the lost revenues in local tourism industry as a result of a humanitarian crisis in the 
country or region (I2). This is particularly true for the economy of the Aegean Islands which is 
highly dependent on income generated by tourism. When the crisis had reached its peak in 
2015, thousands of POCs arrived to the islands per day. The images of overcrowded initial 
reception sites and beaches covered in deflated rubber boats, life vests and personal belongings 
of refugees, as presented in the media, have largely deterred potential visitors from travelling 
to the Aegean since then. 
Third, corruption issues in the country of service (I1). In the current Corruption Perception 
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Index (CPI) for the year 2016, issued by Transparency International (2017), Greece scores 44 
out of 100 points, where a score of 100 indicates “very clean” countries. This result (Rank 69) 
is the second worst performance of all European Union member states, apart from Bulgaria, 
ranked 75th, and 34 places behind Botswana as the highest ranked African country. 
Political Governance 
Other than the challenges emerging from collaboration with government bodies as 
implementing partners (discussed under External Integration) the challenges addressed in this 
paragraph relate to political decisions and procedures within the host government of the crisis 
region and how they affect the work of HOs. Among all external challenge categories, Political 
Governance-related challenges have been discussed most extensively throughout the 
interviews. In fact, practitioners have particularly emphasized the high degree of government 
interference in humanitarian operations (J1) as well as the often lengthy decision-making 
processes within the apparatus of state (J2). 
Several reasons (RCCs) for governmental interference in the work of HOs have been argued. 
In some cases local authorities refuse the import of items (relief items, equipment for search 
and rescue, etc.) into the country in order to protect the local markets. Hence, the import of rice 
or cereals might be restricted to avoid a decline in prices for local products. However, in many 
cases the products in question are unavailable in the country. Therefore political reasons such 
as the diplomatic relations between the receiving country and a product’s country of origin are 
decisive for import ban decisions. In fact, the same political reasons might also affect the host 
government’s willingness to accept POCs from another country or region. The greater the 
tensions between two countries, the less supportive their governments are when it comes to 
offer refuge to the other citizens. Beyond that, governments usually claim full control over all 
decisions made on their sovereign territory (see External Integration). 
“UNHCR is not a body that precedes over the government, you know we help the 
government to make decisions and we advocate for the rights of refugees. But once the 
government says no and a ‘full stop’, that’s it! […] The government was a challenge 
though they were hindering the very foundation of our existence in Sudan. To register 
25 000 refugees took over one and a half years, compared to the two months it took to 
register over 50 000 in Greece. This is simply because the government did not let us do 
our job without their constant involvement as they did not agree on who was a refugee 
and who was not.” 
Associate External Relations Officer, UNHCR Greece, 2017 
Another government practice that has caused great dissent among UNHCR practitioners 
interviewed in Greece is the retention of 24 percent VAT on all humanitarian revenues in the 
country. Some of them have suspected this to be a method of generating profit through the 
investment of the money and siphoning off the interest before returning the VAT after a couple 
of years. 
Finally, governments not only obstruct the work of HOs by imposing policies and restrictions, 
but also through delaying the decisions-making process. Owing to frequent changes of priority 
and the postponement of decision-making in order to evaluate all facts while at the same time 
lacking experience in handling refugee crises and qualified human resources in general, 
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governments are usually perceived to work unnecessarily slow. 
Security 
While, in theory, Security-related challenges comprise all potential dangers and threats that 
humanitarian workers but also relief items, equipment and HO facilities are exposed to, the 
focus of discussion throughout the interviews has been on staff security. Here, two major CCs 
are distinguished – inflicted (K1) and self-inflicted security threats to humanitarian workers in 
the field (K3). While the latter largely refers to individual carelessness (“Won’t happen to me-
mentality”, Field Safety Advisor, UNHCR Greece, 2017) and unawareness of the dangerous 
surrounding environment, the inflicted security threats stem from more diverse RCCs. 
However, the awareness of self-inflicted security threats among humanitarian practitioners has 
to be increased. Especially since a high degree of individual alertness appears to be the easiest 
way to reduce accidents and losses of humanitarian staff. Addressing external (thus inflicted) 
threats, in turn, is potentially more difficult, as the underlying RCCs are more complex and 
HOs usually only have limited or no means to influence them. RCCs that have been discussed 
in this context are religious affiliation, origin or skin color of humanitarian workers which make 
them more easily recognizable as foreigners, thus lucrative targets for abductions and extortions 
for both political and financial motives. 
A terrifying example of the substantial dangers faced by UN personnel in the field is the case 
of murdered Swedish politician and UN investigator Zaida Catalán. Catalán, an American 
colleague and a local interpreter had been kidnapped on 12 March 2017 on a mission to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Two weeks later all three had been found dead. Shortly 
thereafter, a video had appeared showing the execution and mutilation of the hostages (The 
Guardian, 2017).The case has remained in the authors’ memories as it emerged during the time 
of their internship at UNHCR in Greece. During subsequent conversations with practitioners at 
Athens BO, the more experienced UN officers among them have explained that the security 
threats have dramatically increased since they had started working for the UN system. 
“Before, the UN flag was held up high in war zones – to secure our safety. During the 
night they would even illuminate it with spotlights. But nowadays, every gunman would 
just say ‘Thanks for making it easier to shoot you in the dark!’” 
Snr. Supply Officer, UNHCR Greece, 2017 
Apart from that, in exceptional cases, security threats to humanitarian workers may also arise 
from POCs. Especially when different factors such as language barriers and lengthy, 
complicated registration processes prevent them from moving on to their desired destination. 
Aggravated anxieties and frustrations may then erupt in aggressions against humanitarian staff. 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure is among the two least discussed challenge categories of the whole framework. 
No more than three interviewees have addressed a total of four challenges which have been 
combined into the two CCs “outdated infrastructure” (L1) and “access restrictions to certain 
(remote) areas” (L2). 
When talking about outdated infrastructure, practitioners have usually referred to the old 
transportation network in the country of service that has not been destroyed in the course of a 
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disaster but rather has been decaying for many years. Two interviewees have also remembered 
the poor conditions of the sewage system that they had encountered. In one case, when setting 
up a refugee camp on abandoned former military premises in Greece, the sewers had to be 
refurbished and significantly expanded in order to supply the camp with fresh water. In another 
case, during an operation in Southern Africa, even the housing area of humanitarian workers 
had been cut off water supply for days due to an outdated water pump had which eventually 
failed completely. The reasons for the poor conditions of local infrastructure have been the 
same in most of the cases. The local governments are lacking financial resources to afford 
restoration measures. 
The access restrictions to certain areas (often located away from conurbations) which have been 
discussed as the other CC regarding Infrastructure, also relate to the aforementioned poor 
conditions of the local transportation network. In many developing countries roads are 
unsurfaced. During the rainy season, however, many of these roads are flooded thus impassable. 
In consequence, the distribution of relief supplies needs to be re-routed (if possible) or HOs 
have to resort to alternative – often very costly – means of transport (e.g. helicopters) for 
handling last mile deliveries. 
Community / Public 
Community and Public is a new category which has been identified by the authors at an early 
stage of the case study in Greece. On 29 March 2017 the authors accompanied a group of 
UNHCR Field Associates to so-called “urban housing” sites in the city center of Athens. Urban 
housing sites are basically abandoned buildings, such as schools or office buildings, which have 
been occupied by different leftist or anti-authoritarian groups in order to live in them. Since the 
beginning of the refugee crisis and especially since the closure of the Balkan Route, forcing 
refugees to stay in Greece, these squats have become home to a growing number of POCs. 
Although they are eligible for shelter in official camps (usually located in the countryside), 
some of them prefer to move to Athens and try to make a living there. While few of them get 
access to proper apartments by support of fellow countrymen (e.g. through Syrian associations 
in Athens) many other end up in urban housing supported by the aforementioned leftist/anti-
authoritarian communities who provide them with food, voluntary education programs (e.g. 
language courses, day care) and to a certain degree also protection. 
However, communities are not exclusively welcoming and do not always have a positive 
attitude towards immigrants. Urban housing sites occupied by refugees have been under attack 
by nationalist and right-wing groups repeatedly in the past. While some attacks have been 
verbal, other incidents included violent assaults using Molotov cocktails. 
Finally, the media as major opinion leaders contribute significantly to the public perception of 
immigrants and refugees. Thus, positive and compassionate media coverage increases the 
chances for POCs to be treated respectfully and to find support from local communities. Apart 
from that, HOs themselves are very dependent on frequent positive reports about their work 
and contribution to resolve crises in order to attract donors to fund their programs. Negative 
and sensational reports, however, have the opposite effect. 
Against this backdrop, three CCs have been identified from the interview contributions of four 
humanitarian practitioners. For example, the lack of goodwill and sense for integration on the 
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part of local communities and authorities (M2) has already been indicated above. It usually 
stems from a lack of understanding and empathy for the POCs and the situation they are in. 
This has been especially problematic in parts of the Greek society, which had been severely 
affected by the financial crisis, and therefore had little sympathy for the misery of refugees. 
Sensational news reports in the media have only increased the fear of foreigners coming and 
taking the rare jobs and welfare benefits. 
Table 12: External Challenges discussed during Interviews in Greece 
Category # Challenge Root Cause 
No. of 
People 
P
h
y
si
ca
l 
E
le
m
en
ts
 o
f 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t 
H1 
Spontaneous/unforeseen 
need for products and 
measures atypical in the 
crisis region (e.g. heaters 
for refugee camps in 
Greece; need to re-locate 
refugees to houses) 
Occurrence of atypical weather phenomena (e.g. heavy snowfall on Greek 
islands) 
1 
H2 
Detention of shelter (i.e. 
tent) material 
Sustained exposure to sunlight, dust, wind and no humidity (especially in summer 
months) 
1 
H3 
Inappropriate shelter for 
prevailing weather 
conditions (e.g. inside 
temperature of tents in 
Greece during summer 
months between 50 and 60 
degrees Celsius) 
Distribution of cheap and simple tents from army supplies that were available to 
meet urgent needs for a short time 
1 
S
o
ci
o
-E
co
n
o
m
ic
a
l 
I1 
Corruption issues in the 
country of service 
 1 
I2 
Lost revenues in local 
tourism industry 
- Large influx of refugees on tourist sites 
- Pollution of tourist sites with unused NFIs, packaging waste, life vests, 
   deflated rubber boats 
1 
I3 
Envy and jealousy among 
implementing partners 
- Local staff (employed by local/governmental implementing partners) receive 
   lower salaries than expats employed by international NGOs for doing the 
   same work 
- Local staff receive less frequent payments (e.g. 3 months not paid) than expats 
   employed by international NGOs 
- Local staff accommodated under poor conditions compared to expats employed 
   by international NGOs 
- Different working conditions (e.g. payment, pension) among different 
   organizations (salary gaps among expats) 
2 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
G
o
v
er
n
a
n
ce
 
J1 
Host government 
interference in 
humanitarian operation 
- Protection of local market 
- Government does not want to lose control/influence on their sovereign territory 
- Government seeks to make national profit from crisis situation (e.g. Greek 
   government withholds 24% VAT on all revenues made by HOs to collect 
   interest for that money) 
- Government pursues own interests and seeks to support them by conducting 
   own assessments and publishing own figures (e.g. number of refugees per site / 
   in the country) 
7 
J2 
Lengthy/slow decision-
making process at host 
government 
- Frequent changes of priority 
- Postponement of decision-making 
- Wish to evaluate and control every activity 
- Lack of government capacities and capabilities 
- Lack of experience and preparation for large refugee crisis 
- Contradictory: decentralized vs. centralized decision-making 
7 
J3 
Tensions between host 
government and HOs 
- Defending the rights and protecting the lives of refugees, that may be on the run 
   for political reasons, leads HOs into political opposition to certain groups/ 
   governments 
- Taking a position by showing a certain reaction or taking no position by 
   showing no reaction exposes HOs to criticism from different directions 
- Negative experiences made during previous missions 
- HOs defining emergencies themselves and coming into a country without 
   official invitation 
- Perception that HOs are only coming to help the needs of foreign POCs while 
   the domestic population continues to suffer 
4 
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Table 12 continued 
Category # Challenge Root Cause 
No. of 
People 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
K1 
Inflicted security threats to 
humanitarian workers in 
the field 
- Religious affiliation of humanitarian workers 
- Country of origin of humanitarian workers 
- Skin color of humanitarian workers 
- Stress of POCs (abusive environment, exhaustion, lack of understanding due to 
   language barriers, length of processes keeping refugees from moving forward 
   towards destination) 
- Humanitarian workers became lucrative targets for abductions and extortions 
   (political and financial motives) 
4 
K2 
Looting/robbery of relief 
supplies and vehicles 
- Misery and lack of (good) prospects of local community 
- Armed groups seeking to convey a (political) message (e.g. "Leave the 
   country!") or follow financial motives 
1 
K3 
Self-inflicted security 
threats to humanitarian 
workers 
- Carelessness of humanitarian workers and "Won't happen to me"-mentality 
- Unawareness of dangerous environment 
2 
In
fr
a
st
ru
c
-
tu
re
 
L1 Outdated infrastructure 
No financial resources from local government to improve conditions (e.g. water 
supply and sewer system) 
2 
L2 
Access restrictions to 
certain (remote) areas 
- Destroyed infrastructure (e.g. flooded during rainy season) 
- Poor/simple existing local infrastructure (unsurfaced roads) 
3 
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 /
 P
u
b
li
c 
M1 
Public/community 
reluctance/reservation 
towards operation 
- Lack of understanding and empathy ("We are suffering under a crisis and need 
   support ourselves!") 
- No understanding of in-kind and earmarked donations 
    humanitarian aid comes from international humanitarian funds and is not 
        deviated from/cannot be deviated to local population 
1 
M2 
Lack of goodwill and sense 
for integration of local 
communities and local 
authorities 
- Lack of understanding and empathy 
- Sensational news reports in the media create fear and do not create / even hinder 
   the creation of empathy with POCs 
2 
M3 
Negative public perception/ 
media exposure 
("bad publicity") 
- Large supply with funding (e.g. taxpayer money) 
- Lengthy discussions and decision-making processes with host government 
   causing casualties among POCs due to unmet needs (e.g. frozen in a tent 
   during winter) 
2 
 
4.2 Findings from the Questionnaire related to the Challenges Assessment Framework 
Below the findings from the questionnaire with UNHCR practitioners are presented. For all 
challenge categories – internal to HOs and the SCs they operate in and external to them – the 
respective assessments of i) how common they are, ii) what impact they have and iii) if they can 
be solved are indicated, while the orange bar shows ER and the green bar shows OO results. 
This reflects on the three related dimensions in the Challenge Assessment Framework 
(Figure13) which are i) probability of occurrence, ii) impact on the operation and iii) probability 
to overcome/mitigate the category related challenges. 
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Figure 22: Results from Questionnaire with UNHCR Practitioners – Internal Challenge Categories 
While the bars indicate the mean value from the total result for the respective internal challenge 
categories, the numerical values for each assessment can be viewed in the tabular data 
presentation at the bottom of each chart. As an example, for Personnel-related challenges the 
practitioners assess the probability of occurrence (how common they are) on average 5,37 in 
ER and 4,53 in OO. The impact on the operation is estimated on average 5,58 in ER and 4,79 
in OO. Finally, the probability to overcome/mitigate (can they be solved) Personnel-related 
challenges amount to 4,95 in ER and 5,47 in OO on average. This means, that with regard to 
Personnel on average all values for ER range within likely/ considerable impact (5) and very 
likely/ serious impact (6) and for OO within medium likely/ medium impact (4) and likely/ 
considerable impact (5). 
 
Figure 23: Results from Questionnaire with UNHCR Practitioners – External Challenge Categories 
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5. Analysis 
In this chapter, the findings from the literature review (Phase I) and the empirical study (Phase 
II) are brought together in order to develop a comprehensive overview of challenges in 
humanitarian operations as perceived by UNHCR practitioners and scientific researchers. 
Apart from that, the analysis results of the challenges assessment are presented unveiling the 
most critical challenge categories in ER and OO on the basis of nineteen practitioner responses 
to the online questionnaire conducted with UNHCR. Furthermore, by employing risk matrices 
well-established in the UN system and specifically in UNHCR, the authors propose an approach 
to address challenge categories at different criticality levels. 
The structure of the following chapter supports this dichotomous presentation of analysis 
results. While the first section presents deliverables for RQ1 and RQ2, such as a Combined 
Challenges Framework composed from both literature and empirical findings (Figure 24), the 
second section answers to RQ3 by incorporating internal UN/UNHCR risk management 
policies as well as recent publications on the mitigation of SC risks in the humanitarian context. 
5.1 RQ1 and RQ2 – Challenges, contextual Variations and Interrelations 
In Chapter 2.1 a framework for categorizing challenges, internal and external to HOs and the 
SCs they operate in, has been presented and applied to the findings from the initial literature 
review of this study (Figure 9). The same Challenges Framework is further utilized to illustrate 
the combined findings from the aforementioned review of scientific publications and the 
empirical case study conducted with UNHCR in Greece. In accordance with research questions 
one and two, the Combined Challenges Framework (Figure 24) lists challenges in humanitarian 
operations and indicates how they vary – or conform – between ER and OO scenarios (RQ1). 
Furthermore, the interrelations of challenges are highlighted with the help of multiple arrows 
connecting RCCs from supposedly different areas (e.g. Funding and Donations or Personnel-
related) to all relevant CCs as discussed by practitioners or in scientific papers (RQ2). However, 
it has to be mentioned at this point that the allocation of certain RCCs to the ER-side or the OO-
side of the framework does not necessarily mean that those RCCs can be found in either context 
exclusively. Whenever it has been possible based on literature or practitioner evidence, RCCs 
have been assigned to one side according to higher relevance. Hence low HO budgets and lack 
of funding RCCs are perceived more critical in OO (Yadav and Barve, 2016; L’Hermitte et al., 
2016; Jahre and Heigh, 2008) and can be found on the right side of the framework, while 
Demand Uncertainty-related RCCs such as response generated demand (Holguín-Veras et al., 
2012) and biased forecasting (van der Laan et al., 2016) are deemed more disruptive in ER (van 
der Laan et al., 2016; Yadav an Barve, 2016) and consequently assigned to the left side. 
However, in many cases a clear separation has not been reasonable or even possible. 
Sometimes, neither authors nor practitioners have clearly assigned RCCs to either side (e.g. 
donor pressure or local staff receiving lower salaries less frequently) while CCs are distinctly 
positioned. In other cases, such as over-reporting (CC 2/ER, 1/OO – Information Systems) and 
inflicted / self-inflicted security threats to field workers (CC 1/ER/OO, 2/ER/OO – Security), 
when CCs are likely to appear in both ER and OO contexts, it has been particularly complicated 
to assign RCCs to one side of the framework explicitly. In those cases as described last, RCCs 
have been arranged in a pragmatic, space-optimizing way. This means that RCCs tend to be 
60 
positioned on the OO-side as fewer challenges have been discussed in this context exclusively. 
Consequently, RCCs found on either side of the framework also apply for the other side (i.e. in 
the other context) when related CCs are deemed critical in both contexts as discussed above. 
The authors are aware of this inaccuracy. However, the framework presented in this study does 
not claim encompassing preciseness in the depiction of the rather abstract concept of mutual 
challenge interrelations, presumably interpreted differently by various individuals and 
organizations. It has been developed in order to increase the awareness of RCCs in humanitarian 
operations and there are possibilities for further improvement which will be indicated in the 
concluding chapter. 
Apart from that, the focus of the analysis is on the findings from the empirical study, thus 
challenges discussed by practitioners during interview sessions and observations made in 
Greece. Those insights are supported by references from literature. However, this does not mean 
that literature is of subordinate importance for this study. As explained in earlier chapters, 
insights from literature have been used to develop the Challenges Framework and thus have 
been largely considered in the conceptualization of the data collection approach. Furthermore, 
the knowledge about challenges described in literature has enabled the authors to ask precise 
follow-up questions during the interview sessions, give thought-provoking impulses in 
situations when interview partners have been unsure about how to interpret a challenge category 
and finally facilitated the identification of relations among challenges discussed. Whenever 
possible, the CCs and RCCs mentioned by practitioners have been compared to and merged 
with literature elaborations in a comprehensive Excel spreadsheet. Apart from CCs and RCCs 
including the respective authors and practitioners discussing them, this data file also contains 
sporadic practitioner estimates about diverging characteristics (i.e. criticality) of different 
challenges in various contexts such as i) different regions/countries, ii) different cultures, iii) 
different sizes of operation (i.e. the number of involved actors) and iv) different time elapsed 
since occurrence of the disaster (early/mid/late ER/OO). Finally, solutions to different 
challenges as proposed by practitioners and researchers are included. 
Figure 24 visualizes an excerpt of the main findings (from the data file) with a focus on ER and 
OO as they form the core of this study. Moreover, the authors consider the inclusion of 
additional contexts or the solutions to be detrimental to the quality of the framework for two 
main reasons. First, due to the aforementioned incomplete data situation regarding the different 
contexts (especially natural vs. man-made disasters) no extensive comparisons can be made for 
all challenges or challenge categories. Second, by including additional contexts in the 
framework, coming along with additional boxes and arrows to clarify relations, the complexity 
of the figure would increase significantly and thus adversely affect its comprehensibility. 
Hence, it appears that the only feasible way of presenting all combined analysis results for CCs, 
RCCs, various contexts and solutions is in tabular form. However, due to the extent of 38 
columns and 40 rows, the comprehensive data set not only exceeds the limits of presentability 
in this chapter but even in the appendix. The authors therefore refer readers, interested in all 
details, to an additional (Excel) data file which can be requested from the authors directly. 
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Figure 24: Combined Challenges Framework (from Literature Review and Empirical Study) 
(Christofferson and Müller, 2017) 
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Discussion of Framework Excerpts 
Comparing both the Challenges Framework (Figure 9) presented in Chapter 2.1 and the 
Combined Challenges Framework (Figure 24) a number of differences become apparent. First, 
the aforementioned underrepresentation of OO-related challenges in extant literature, leading 
to more and larger gaps on the right side of the Challenges Framework as recognizable in  
Figure 9. In reality, however, practitioners tend to assign more challenges (both CCs and RCCs) 
to both ER and OO operations (e.g. over-reporting). This second observation – the higher 
number of challenges that have been rated critical in multiple contexts (primarily ER and OO) 
during the empirical study (15 in the combined framework compared to 5 in the literature-based 
framework) – might be explained by the difficulties to delineate the different contexts properly. 
Following the definitions of ER and OO discussed in Chapter 2.1, the current UNHCR 
operation in Greece has to be classified as ER. However, during multiple interviews, 
practitioners (e.g. Field Safety Advisor, UNHCR Greece, 2017) emphasized the almost stable 
character of the operation since the number of new arrivals to Greece has been reduced 
significantly (due to the EU-Turkey statement and the closure of the Balkan Route in March 
2016) and the majority of POCs has been relocated into more weather resistant (containers) or 
even permanent (apartments) accommodations. Hence, the immediate emergency character of 
the operation has been alleviated which is why many interviewees referred to the Greece 
operation as late ER. This differentiation between late ER and early OO complicates a clear 
delineation of both contexts and might explain the increased allocation of challenges to both 
sides. 
Third, the thirteenth challenge category in Figure 24 (Community/Public) has been added 
during the interviews, as discussed in the empirical findings chapter, in order to accurately 
include the challenges emanating from the host community as well as the public (including the 
media) into the analysis. This gap in extant research has thus been closed with this study, 
allowing for more accurate categorization of external challenges in the future. 
Fourth, the number and degree of inter-RCC linkages is larger in the combined framework. The 
main reason for this is basically, that interrelations between challenges have not been 
investigated to a greater extent throughout previous studies with the exception of the 
noteworthy research by Yadav and Barve (2016). In interview situations, however, researchers 
are given the possibility to ask specific follow-up questions in order to uncover causalities and 
interdependencies which has facilitated a more accurate illustration of inter-RCC linkages in 
Figure 24. Although probably more linkages exist than have been uncovered in this study. One 
remaining issue in this regard is the limited connectibility of RCCs listed on opposite sides of 
the framework. However, as explained earlier there are cases when CCs appear in both ER and 
OO contexts and RCCs are positioned in a space-optimizing way, thus distributed on both sides. 
Although for example the high level of bureaucracy within HOs pursued in order to meet 
transparency and documentation requirements imposed by donors might potentially also be an 
issue in ER and further interrelated with CCs such as the lack of experienced (local) 
implementing partners (CC 2/ER – External Integration), who are unfamiliar with bureaucratic 
documentation and certification practices in HOs, the illustration of such connections appears 
restricted. The same applies to connections to other RCCs. While deficient coordination and 
collaboration among implementing partners can be traced back to the aforementioned intra-
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organizational bureaucracy, this linkage unfortunately cannot be emphasized by arrows 
between the right and the left side of the framework. However, to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge no better alternative solutions exist to illustrate challenges interrelations (both CCs 
and RCCs) in different contexts, such as ER and OO in this case. 
The chosen presentation method in the Challenges Framework, using arrows to point out 
relations, reveals that field workers’ inabilities to capture the right data when working under 
time pressure can be the source of multiple disruptions in a humanitarian operation. For 
example, time pressure in ER situations together with the aspiration to deliver high quality work 
while being aware of potential human losses due to own decisions can be responsible for high 
levels of personal stress among humanitarian workers (CC 2/ER – Personnel). Furthermore, 
both the incorrect use of IT systems, e.g. when entering unclear product descriptions such as 
“women clothes” for a vast selection of items ranging from trousers to shirts and scarfs into the 
inventory list of the ERP system (CC 1/ER – Information Systems) as well as constant over-
reporting (CC 2/ER, 1/OO – Information Systems) can be traced back to data capturing 
inabilities in the field. According to a Senior Technical Officer at UNHCR Greece (2017), many 
reports are created as an end in themselves rather than to inform their recipients. There are 
numerous interest groups (e.g. donors) frequently requesting status updates but no common 
standards for reporting or instructions for humanitarian workers – especially those new to the 
humanitarian sector – on how to report concisely. As a consequence, irrelevant data is 
assembled in comprehensive reports that miss their original purpose. 
However, it can also be shown that even other RCCs are attributable to field workers’ data 
capturing inabilities under time pressure. Among them the lack of accurate real-time demand 
data, as direct consequence of the data capturing failure, negatively effects the ability to plan 
or forecast demands – especially on field level (CC 1/ER – Demand Uncertainty) and further 
adds to the generally difficult demand assessment process in humanitarian SCs compared to 
their commercial counterparts (CC 2/ER – Demand Uncertainty). Eventually, even problems 
and disruptions relating to bias of field workers, especially in terms of accurate demand 
forecasting, might potentially stem from data capturing inabilities under time pressure as well. 
Faced with uncertainty about the determination of correct demand/order quantities and the fear 
to risk human lives due to a lack of adequate supplies because of under-forecasting, field 
workers tend to order more than is likely to be needed in order to be prepared for unforeseen 
events (van der Laan et al., 2016). Since these practices are usually carried out in addition to 
logistical optimization methods pursued by the central logistics/supply unit (e.g. reorder points 
or optimal order quantities), large quantities of relief items are frequently dispatched to areas 
where they are not needed to the full extent. Instead, they rather congest the local supply 
network in the disaster region by taking up limited warehouse space and binding rare competent 
workforce. This is largely comparable to material convergence (as indicated in Figure 9) 
although the latter describes the phenomenon of mass arrivals of useless, unsolicited (in-kind) 
donations in the aftermath of a disaster thus creating congestions and complications in logistics 
handling/distribution systems and facilities in the disaster region (e.g. Holguín-Veras et al., 
2012). Finally, over-forecasting leads to tied up HO capital in so-called “dead stock” (Jahre et 
al., 2016) which could be used more effectively elsewhere. Biased forecasting is therefore a 
prominent example for lack of process compliance (CC 2/ER, 2/OO – Processes & Standard 
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Procedures) and also contributes to the already mentioned unpredictability of demand 
assessment and forecasting in humanitarian SCs (CC 1/ER, 2/ER – Demand Uncertainty). 
Having pointed out the complexity of mutual challenges interrelations, it seems advisable to 
first focus on the identification of RCCs that show numerous connections to other challenges 
and to develop strategies for counteracting them in order to approach the multitude of 
challenges in humanitarian operations in a systematic way. 
5.2 RQ3 – Challenges Criticality Assessment 
In this section the analysis of the answers to the online questionnaire, submitted by UNHCR 
practitioners involved in the Greece operation, is presented. For this purpose, the pursued 
analysis process is described based on selected examples (i.e. challenge categories) before the 
most critical challenge categories in ER and OO are unveiled in the end of Chapter 5.2.1. 
Finally, the results are embedded in the current UN/UNHCR risk management approach in 
order to derive solid management strategies, depending on the level of challenge criticality. 
5.2.1 Challenges Criticality in ER and OO 
The responses of nineteen UNHCR practitioners with sufficient experience in both ER and OO 
are included in the analysis of this study. Figures 22 (internal) and 23 (external) in Chapter 4.2 
summarize the average assessment results regarding i) the probability of occurrence, ii) the 
(negative) impact on the operation and iii) the probability to overcome category-related 
challenges or mitigate their negative impact in the respective contexts. Following the design of 
the Challenges Assessment Framework (Figure 13) introduced in Chapter 2.2.3, these results 
should be presented in two three-dimensional matrices – one displaying the ER, the other one 
displaying the OO context – in order to facilitate mutual comparability. However, this initial 
endeavor has already been rejected at an early stage when it had become apparent that many 
points within the matrix, each representing a challenge category, would overlay due to the 
relative proximity of the mean values (all in the range between 3.5 and 6.5 of total 7.0). Hence, 
the informative value of the figures would be insignificant. The authors have therefore decided 
to plot the criticality of each challenge category individually. Two-dimensional matrices, 
indicating the probability to overcome/mitigate category-related challenges (x-axis) and the 
probability of their occurrence in the course of a humanitarian operation (y-axis), are 
supplemented by two color-coded discs of which the orange one indicates the impact on ER 
operations and the green one the impact on OO, accordingly. Figures 25 and 26 illustrate two 
exemplary challenge categories with rather “extreme” assessment results. Furthermore, both 
groups of challenges are represented by this selection – those internal to HOs and the SCs they 
operate in (Figure 26) as well as those emanating from the external environment (Figure 25). 
Although the two-dimensional-matrix presentation method preserves a reference to the 
Challenges Assessment Framework defined in Chapter 2.2.3 (although strongly abstracted), it 
appears to be only conditionally suited to provide a comparison between the different categories 
and even complicates the compilation of an exact ranking of the most critical challenge 
categories in ER compared to OO. 
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Figure 25: Political Governance-related 
Challenges (Christofferson and Müller, 2017) 
 
Figure 26: Internal Integration-related 
Challenges (Christofferson and Müller, 2017) 
 
For this reason, the authors have decided to reject the exclusively graphic evaluation and 
presentation of results in favor of tabular display. However, in order to allow for sorting the 
different internal and external challenge categories according to their level of criticality in a 
humanitarian operation, an auxiliary value – the Challenge Value – needs to be computed first. 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
                                 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 
It has to be noted, however, that the values assigned to the Likelihood to Overcome or Mitigate 
Impact (same as the aforementioned Probability to Overcome or Mitigate Negative Impact on 
Operation) differ from those assigned to the remaining dimensions Likelihood of Occurrence 
(same as Probability of Occurrence) and Impact on Operation. Although all three dimensions 
are measured using the same 1 to 7 Likert scale, one significant difference regarding the 
interpretation of assessment values needs to be considered. While for the Likelihood of 
Occurrence and the Impact on Operation the highest value (“7” – extremely likely / catastrophic 
impact) constitutes the most negative and unfavorable result for an operation, its meaning with 
regard to the Likelihood to Overcome or Mitigate Impact (“7” – extremely likely) is diametrical. 
Hence, in order to reflect the practitioners’ assessment correctly, the assigned values regarding 
the Likelihood to Overcome or Mitigate Impact need to be inverted in the following way before 
multiplying them with the Likelihood of Occurrence and the Impact on Operation. 
Assessment Value: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Multiply with: 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
This guarantees that a high possibility/likelihood to solve a challenge (thus a positive 
characteristic) does not overly multiply the Challenge Value but rather keeps it low compared 
to other challenges with minor prospects of solutions. 
Potential misunderstandings on the part of participants have been prevented by providing 
unmistakable explanations for each assessment that has been requested throughout the 
questionnaire (see full questionnaire in Appendix C). Apart from that, the review of all 
questionnaire responses suggests that the participants have been aware that the highest value 
(“7”) related to the Likelihood to Overcome or Mitigate Impact indicates the best chances of 
solving the respective challenge. 
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Applying the formula defined above, the Challenge Values have been computed for each 
respondent (nineteen respondents), challenge category (seven internal, six external) and context 
(two – ER and OO). The mean value has then been determined for each challenge category and 
context. This allows to contrast ER and OO and compare the criticality levels (corresponds to 
Challenge Value) of different challenge categories in each context as perceived by humanitarian 
aid practitioners. The results are summarized in the following tables (Table 13 and Table 14). 
Table 13: Criticality of Challenge Categories in ER, sorted by highest Challenge Value, descending 
Rank Category Challenge Value Common Impact Solvability 
1 Political Governance  171,28 6,11 6,37 3,72 
2 Infrastructure 163,00 5,79 5,79 3,53 
3 
Physical Elements of 
Environment 
148,26 5,89 6,05 4,00 
4 Socio-Economical 144,11 5,53 5,32 3,50 
5 Security 132,76 5,61 5,84 4,00 
6 Community / Public 126,53 5,84 5,68 4,26 
7 Funding & Donations 125,00 6,00 6,05 4,44 
8 External Integration 118,74 5,89 5,84 4,68 
9 Demand Uncertainty 98,22 5,94 5,50 4,89 
10 Personnel 90,58 5,37 5,58 4,95 
11 Information Systems 88,95 5,53 5,47 5,05 
12 
Processes & Standard 
Procedures 
87,28 5,44 5,56 5,11 
13 Internal Integration 82,00 4,78 5,11 4,61 
 
Table 14: Criticality of Challenge Categories in OO, sorted by highest Challenge Value, descending 
Rank Category Challenge Value Common Impact Solvability 
1 Political Governance  131,21 5,63 5,58 3,84 
2 Community / Public 109,16 5,42 5,37 4,32 
3 Funding & Donations 100,84 5,26 5,47 4,63 
4 Infrastructure 99,42 4,79 4,79 3,84 
5 Security 97,35 5,17 5,32 4,28 
6 Socio-Economical 97,17 4,79 4,74 3,94 
7 
Physical Elements of 
Environment 
87,79 5,05 5,05 4,47 
8 External Integration 78,58 4,95 5,16 4,74 
9 Internal Integration 73,61 4,44 4,89 4,72 
10 
Processes & Standard 
Procedures 
62,28 4,67 4,56 5,00 
11 Information Systems 56,68 4,74 4,68 5,42 
12 Demand Uncertainty 56,67 4,56 4,56 5,11 
13 Personnel 54,74 4,53 4,79 5,47 
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The entries of Tables 13 and 14 are color-coded. In compliance with the design of the 
Challenges Framework, red represents those challenge categories internal to HOs and the SCs 
they operate in while blue indicates external challenge categories. Apart from that, the columns 
Common, Impact and Solvability correspond to the simplified diction used in the questionnaire 
in order to avoid participant confusion due to overly complicated formulations, including 
vocabulary such as “probability” or “likelihood” that remind of statistical analyses rather than 
the experience-based assessment the authors have aimed at. For this reason, the Common 
column is representative for the aforementioned Probability/Likelihood of Occurrence, while 
the Impact column represents the Impact on Operation and the Solvability column stands for 
the Probability/Likelihood to Overcome or Mitigate Impact dimension of the initial Challenges 
Assessment Framework (Figure 13). 
At first sight, it can be seen that external challenge categories are assessed more critical in both 
contexts. Among them Political Governance shows the highest Probability/Likelihood of 
Occurrence and the highest negative Impact on Humanitarian Operations of all challenge 
categories in both ER and OO. Apart from that, the Probability/Likelihood to Overcome or 
Mitigate the Impact of Political Governance-related challenges is deemed the third lowest in 
ER and lowest in OO (together with Infrastructure-related challenges). In essence this means 
that Political Governance-related challenges constitute a significant problem in humanitarian 
operations, regardless of emergency or prolonged assistance, where humanitarian workers see 
only marginal potentials for positive influence. The selection of appropriate strategies to deal 
with such, as well as other, unfavorable situations in the best possible way, is subject to further 
research. An outlook at the applicability of risk management strategies and tools well-
established in the UN/UNHCR system is therefore given in the concluding section of this 
chapter. 
The criticality of external factors is also made clear by the assessment of supposedly internal 
Funding and Donations-related challenges. They are deemed the second most probable 
disruption in ER operations (Common = 6,00) but since the Probability/Likelihood to Overcome 
them or Mitigate their Impact (Solvability = 4,44) is assessed higher than for all external 
challenge categories in ER, their overall criticality in ER operations ranks in the middle field. 
With a Challenge Value of 125,00 Funding and Donations-related challenges are the most 
critical internal challenges in ER and close to the least critical external challenge category, 
Community/Public (Challenge Value = 126,53). 
In OO, Funding and Donations-related challenges are the third most common (Common = 5,26) 
disruption with the second highest impact (Impact = 5,47) on the operation. Therefore, they 
rank among the top three critical challenge categories in this context. The high criticality of 
Funding and Donations-related challenges in OO concurs with the findings discussed above. 
Like no other internal challenge category, Funding and Donations is dependent on external 
factors. Donations are managed within HOs and it is their task to attract funding and to comply 
with donor requirements. However, the actual money (or in-kind donations) comes from outside 
the organization where their influence on decision-making is restricted. Aspects such as donor 
pressure to constantly submit reports, the earmarking of funding for specific use or the 
announcement of the largest donor to humanitarian aid in the world, the United States of 
America, to reduce their contribution significantly (Associate Programme Officer (Donor 
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Relations), UNHCR Greece, 2017) are just a few, yet highly topical, examples of external 
factors impacting on the management of Funding and Donations in humanitarian operations. 
Finally, the fact that external challenges are – without exception – perceived less likely to be 
overcome than internal challenges in either context, accounts for their high criticality in both 
ER and OO. This emphasizes the important role of solutions and mitigation strategies. If 
humanitarian workers do not see a chance to overcome a problem, they assess the respective 
challenge (or challenge category) accordingly. The results of this research have shown that 
humanitarian practitioners apparently do not see sufficient ways to overcome external 
challenges at the moment. It is therefore important to find solutions for these problems, 
emanating from the external environment, or at least strategies to mitigate their negative impact 
on the operation. 
5.2.2 Managing Challenges in Humanitarian Operations 
With challenge categories ranked according to their criticality in different types of humanitarian 
operations (i.e. ER and OO), the next essential step of the SCRM process (Figure 10) involves 
the selection of appropriate risk management strategies. Jahre (2017) has recently compiled a 
comprehensive list of SC strategies and compares their application in commercial and 
humanitarian settings (Table 4). 
In order to propose a structured approach towards the selection of appropriate SC strategies, 
depending on the level of challenge criticality, the authors of this study have decided to apply 
elements of different risk management policies well-established in the UN/UNHCR system. 
For this purpose, parts of the Security Risk Assessment (SRA) included in the UN Security Risk 
Management process (SRM) are merged with the risk analysis approach presented in the 
UNHCR Preparedness Package for Refugee Emergencies. The applicability of the matrix 
derived from this fusion for the purposes of this study is then discussed and a preliminary 
decision support tool is presented for managing challenges in humanitarian operations. 
“SRM is the process of identifying future harmful events (“threats”) that may affect the 
achievement of United Nations objectives. It involves assessing the likelihood and impact of 
these threats to determine the assessed level of risk to the United Nations and identifying 
appropriate response. SRM involves four key strategies, namely controlling, avoiding, 
transferring and accepting security risk. Security risks are controlled through prevention 
(lowering the likelihood) and mitigation (lowering the impact).” (UN, 2016, p.16) 
Similar to common practice in commercial SCRM, discussed for example by Hallikas et al. 
(2002), Norrman and Jansson (2004) and Manuj and Mentzer (2008), risk is defined as follows 
in the UN/UNHCR system: 
- “The likelihood of a harmful event occurring and the impact of the event if it were to 
occur (Risk = Likelihood x Impact).” (UN, 2016, p.16)) 
- “The degree of risk […] is called the level of seriousness of a potential refugee scenario. 
This seriousness is defined by the Impact of the scenario […] multiplied by the 
Likelihood of the influx scenario actually occurring within a given timeframe.” 
(UNHCR, 2014, p.2.5) 
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Four key strategies for managing risk to the UN system are discussed in connection with SRM 
(WFP, 2017). 
Accept: The risk is accepted without having taken any mitigation measures before and 
with no further measures being required. 
Control: The risk needs to be reduced to an acceptable level by implementing prevention 
and/or mitigation measures 
Avoid: The exposure to the risk needs to be evaded by temporarily distancing potential 
targets (e.g. UN staff) from the risk. 
Transfer: The risk is shifted to an insurance company or a sub-contracted implementing 
partner who can operate safely. 
These categories rather appear to be high-level recommendations than case-related strategies. 
Therefore, further research is needed to accurately assign specific SC strategies, such as the 
ones presented by Jahre (2017) (see Table 4), to the aforementioned ACAT (Accept, Control, 
Avoid, Transfer) key recommendations. However, in the rest of this section, the authors discuss 
the potential integration of the ACAT concept into a challenges management approach. 
Apparently even for this solution further research is needed. For example regarding the rather 
vague concept of an acceptable risk level as indicated under the Control strategy above. The 
determination of acceptable risk in the UN system involves a complex process considering 
various factors such as the Programme Criticality Level of different activities which needs to 
be balanced against security risks faced by UN personnel involved in these activities (UN, 
2016). However, the analysis of this process surpasses the scope of this report and might have 
to be subject to subsequent studies. 
The following remarks are intended to illustrate the application possibilities of different 
UN/UNHCR risk management policies and tools. Used in combination with the ACAT 
strategies and extended by further, more specific SC strategies, this approach can be used as 
guideline to effectively manage challenges in humanitarian operations depending on their 
individual level of criticality. 
The Security Risk Analysis Table is a two-dimensional matrix indicating the impact (x-axis) 
and likelihood (y-axis) of a threat and displaying particular risk levels in the intersections (Field 
Safety Advisor, UNHCR Greece, 2017; personal photography, Müller, 2017). In their 
Preparedness Package for Refugee Emergencies UNHCR (2014) propose a similar model. 
Their Risk Matrix also indicates the impact and likelihood of a (refugee) scenario on the 
respective coordinate axes. Beyond that, values on a scale from one to five (one: least 
likely/least impact and five: most likely/most impact) are assigned to the impact and likelihood 
stages. The Seriousness of Risk is determined by multiplying both values. Finally, depending 
on the value of the computed product, different levels of risk seriousness (also referred to as 
risk levels (UN, 2016)) can be defined (e.g. ranging from very low to unacceptable). Those risk 
levels, in turn, can be used to prioritize different risks and, when assigned specific mitigation 
measures (also management/mitigation strategies), also to provide guidance for management 
decisions. Figure 27 combines the two models discussed in this paragraph, highlighting the 
different color-coded risk levels. 
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Figure 27: Combined UN Security Risk Analysis Table and UNHCR Refugee Emergency Risk Matrix  
(based on a personal photography (Müller, 2017) and UNHCR, 2014) 
The underlying concept of the Seriousness of Risk is equivalent to the Challenge Value 
discussed in this report. Although the latter has been computed also taking into account the 
probability/likelihood to overcome or mitigate the negative impact of a challenge category. 
Therefore, in order to illustrate all three dimensions of the challenges assessment (occurrence, 
impact, overcome/mitigate) accurately, a potential Challenge Matrix equivalent to Figure 27 
actually has to be a three-dimensional cube with a side length of seven units and 343 fields in 
total. This does not appear to be feasible. However, it is not needed either. The Challenge 
Values have already been computed (Tables 13 and 14) which is why the matrix is not 
necessarily needed any more. The Challenge Values should be rather assigned to the four key 
strategies (ACAT). The following classification in the style of a traffic light appears sufficient 
as decision support tool (Figure 28). 
 
Figure 28: Preliminary Strategy Light (Christofferson and Müller, 2017) 
The “Strategy Light” in Figure 28 only shows exemplary CV values (CV = Challenge Value) 
and management/mitigation strategies. However, further research is needed in order to 
determine the optimal sizes of the ACAT groups (determined by the size of the respective CV 
group) as for simplicity reasons in this example all groups are of (almost) equal size. Moreover, 
in this configuration only the Control and Transfer groups can be reasonably sub-divided into 
more specific strategies. The examples displayed in Figure 28 have been taken from Table 4 
(thus Jahre, 2017). However, other strategies, such as training internal personnel and external 
implementing partners, have been discussed by several humanitarian practitioners (e.g. Snr. 
Supply Assistant (2), Field Safety Advisor, UNHCR Greece, 2017) and should be considered 
in this context too. By adding more SC strategies from Table 4 as well as solutions discussed 
by literature and practitioners (see Excel data file), the Strategy Light might be extended into a 
comprehensive decision support tool to be applied by humanitarian workers in the field and at 
headquarters. 
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study has been to develop a structured approach to challenges management 
in humanitarian operations. 
 
Figure 29: Challenges Management Process (Christofferson and Müller, 2017;  
inspired by the SCRM Process presented by Manuj and Mentzer, 2008) 
For this purpose, a framework – the Challenges Framework – has been developed based on the 
findings from a comprehensive review of scientific literature in the field of humanitarian 
logistics, supply chain and operations management. This initial model has served as foundation 
for the interview guide that has been used during seventeen interview sessions with 
humanitarian practitioners most of which have been involved in the current UNHCR operation 
in Greece. However, in order to also include and compare experiences of humanitarian workers 
involved with NGOs, thus adding more value to the study results, an interview with a MSF 
practitioner has been conducted as well. The authors are aware that the inclusion of a single 
NGO representative does not allow to provide the full picture of challenges experienced by 
those kinds of organizations. Therefore, further research needs to be done, applying the 
suggested Challenges Framework in more NGOs, preferably with different mandates and 
ranges of service such as food provisioning or children. Furthermore, it needs to be considered 
to select primarily those organizations that are involved in different crisis regions all around the 
globe during both ER and OO, to allow for more differentiated assessments of challenges in 
various contexts. Also the inclusion of organizations of different size is important, since smaller 
HOs might be stronger affected by lack of qualified workforce and financial resources than 
larger (international or supranational) HOs falling back on well-established structures and 
networks. The latter appears to be particularly relevant as this study almost exclusively focuses 
on UNHCR, being part of the UN-system. 
The comprehensive insights gained through the practitioner interviews have been supplemented 
by observations of humanitarian occupational routine both in field situations, when visiting 
refugee camps and strategic stockpiles, as well as in the head office (Branch Office) 
environment during internal training sessions and in the open-plan office. The empirical study 
has not only delivered significant input for the extensive compilation of core and root cause 
challenges as perceived by academic researches and humanitarian practitioners (see Excel data 
file) which constitutes a major deliverable of this thesis project. It has further inspired the 
extension of the initial Challenges Framework (Figure 8) by a thirteenth category 
(Community/Public) that has, as such, not been covered to greater extent by extant literature, to 
the best of the authors’ knowledge. The enhanced Challenges Framework (Figure 24) together 
with the extensive Excel data file constitute the output of the first stage of the Challenges 
Management Process (Figure 29) depicted above. 
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Following the original SCRM process, the next step after the identification of risks would be 
the assessment and evaluation phase. The same applies for the Challenges Management Process 
submitted in this report. Stage 2 is entirely dedicated to answer on RQ3 and a new framework, 
intended to assess the criticality of challenges in humanitarian operations, has been developed 
(Figure 13) inspired by commercial SCRM tools. Although the graphical realization of the 
framework’s three dimensions has turned out to be inexpedient in practice, the Challenges 
Assessment Framework serves as a conceptual model to emphasize the importance of taking 
into account all three dimensions in challenges assessment – i) the probability of occurrence, 
ii) the impact on the operation and particularly iii) the probability to overcome challenges or 
mitigate their negative impact on the operation. The latter appearing under-represented in 
reviewed SCRM literature. Fortunately, the graphical visualization is not needed for 
determining the criticality level of different challenges (or challenge categories as in this study). 
Instead, only the respective assessment values assigned to the individual dimensions (in form 
of the Likert scale numeric values) have to be multiplied in order to obtain the Challenge Value. 
This value appears useful to indicate and compare the criticality levels of different challenges 
(or challenge categories) and thus facilitates the creation of a ranking. These rankings of the 
most critical internal and external challenge categories in ER and OO contexts constitute the 
output of the second stage of the Challenges Management Process. 
Similar to the original SCRM process, the third stage of the Challenges Management Process 
finally relates to the selection of appropriate management strategies. Within this stage, the 
authors propose preliminary findings to answer to the sub-question of RQ3.3 that seeks to 
identify ways to manage challenges in humanitarian operations. However, these examinations 
are not encompassing yet and require further research. What has been able to show is, that there 
are risk management policies and tools currently in use in the UN/UNHCR system which are 
similar to the challenges assessment and analysis process explained in Stage 2. Potential 
applications have been identified and a preliminary decision support tool – the “Strategy 
Light” – following the principle of a traffic light has been derived (Figure 28). The tool employs 
the four – color-coded – key strategy groups Accept, Control, Transfer and Avoid (ACTA) 
suggested in the UN Security Risk Management process (SRM) and the afore-calculated 
Challenge Values are assigned to each group. Thus, depending on the Challenge Value 
computed for a challenge category, the main strategy is either accepting the challenge and the 
impact it has on the operation, controlling it by e.g. building up strategic stock or training staff, 
transferring it to implementing partners or avoiding it completely, if the high level of criticality 
is disproportionate to the potential benefits of the operation. Further research is needed to 
accurately determine the sizes of the color-coded groups and to assign appropriate sub-
strategies, for example the mitigation strategies collected by Jahre (2017) (Table 4), to the key 
strategies (ACTA) in order to suggest tailor-made solutions for the different levels of criticality 
computed in the previous stage of the Challenges Management Process. 
Apart from the structured approach presented above, the study has also revealed a number of 
findings and provides valuable contributions to the field of humanitarian logistics research. 
First, although the research project has been conducted with UNHCR, all frameworks as well 
as assessment and analysis approaches presented above are fully transferrable to other HOs. 
The internal and external challenge categories that have been identified throughout this project 
73 
are universal. However, depending on the examined HO (i.e. size, dispersion, mandate), the 
core challenges and root cause challenges discussed may vary from those presented in Figure 
24, which only shows an excerpt of the extensive findings that have been obtained in the course 
of this project (compare Excel data file). Furthermore, the three-dimensional challenges 
assessment conducted by means of a questionnaire is applicable in the challenges/risk 
assessment process in various SC contexts, not only in humanitarian relief environments. In 
this regard, the design of the questionnaire can be used as a template for further surveys of 
larger scale. Beyond that, the presented formula for calculating the Challenge Value as an 
indicator of the criticality level of any internal or external challenge (or challenge category) is 
applicable without contextual restrictions just as the concept of matching individual solution 
strategies to predefined values. 
Second, a mismatch appears between the numbers of internal/external challenges discussed by 
practitioners during interview sessions and the perceived criticality of those internal/external 
challenges as identified through the questionnaire. While internal challenge categories have 
been discussed twice as extensively as external challenge categories, almost all internal 
categories have been assessed less critical than any external category in both ER and OO 
contexts. (Except for Funding and Donations-related challenges which are perceived highly 
critical in OO; Table 14.) However, this mismatch does not have to be a contradiction. Many 
factors might have contributed to this phenomenon. First, the same (simplified) Challenges 
Framework has been presented to interviewees in the beginning of each interview session (see 
Appendix B). Apparently, internal challenge categories are presented in the upper part of the 
framework followed by the external categories in the lower part. Since most people start reading 
a document from the top, the majority of associations and memories related to certain categories 
might have appeared with regard to internal challenges. The authors have tried to counteract 
this tendency by explicitly asking interviewees for experiences with external challenges. 
However, the overall coverage of those categories has been lower compared to internal 
categories. Another plausible explanation for this phenomenon is the aforementioned low level 
of experience in different international operations among local UNHCR staff members. Since 
six out of seventeen interviewees have stated that the current Greece operation was their first 
engagement in humanitarian relief (see Table 6), their knowledge of challenges is confined to 
the Greek environment. However, compared to other operations in e.g. developing countries, 
many external factors such as security threats or poor local infrastructure are not as striking in 
Greece, being a European Union member state after all. Consequently, these local UNHCR 
staff members could not report about as many external factors as their more senior colleagues. 
In order to ensure informed assessments based on extensive experience in different contexts, 
only those responses to the questionnaire have been considered in the final analysis that fulfil 
the requirement of having participated in at least one ER and one OO operation. Hence, the 
following conclusion from the analysis of the valid questionnaire responses is well-founded.  
External factors are perceived more challenging in both ER and OO than internal factors. 
Among them, Political Governance-related challenges (e.g. host government policies, decision-
making, slowness and disturbing interference in HO work) are perceived by far the most critical 
challenges in humanitarian operations, especially since many practitioners do not see much 
potential to overcome them. Furthermore, Funding and Donations, a supposedly internal 
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challenge category, is also perceived considerably critical with a Challenge Value of 125,00 in 
ER (most critical internal category) and particularly in OO where Funding and Donations-
related challenges are ranked third among the most disruptive challenge categories. Due to the 
existential dependence on external sources to support their program, HOs run the risk of 
being/becoming dependent on large-scale donors pursuing their own – often politically 
motivated – agenda. The concept of “political logistics”, occasionally used by some 
humanitarian practitioners (Snr. Supply Officer, UNHCR Greece, 2017) and academic 
researchers when referring to “humanitarian logistics” therefore appears justified – despite its 
slightly sarcastic undercurrent. 
Other Areas for further Research 
The Challenges Framework presented in this thesis study can neither claim completeness nor 
absolute clarity about all dimensions of RCCs. However, it increases the awareness of the 
existence of RCCs which need to be identified and understood (Stage 1 of the Challenges 
Management Process) in order to make accurate assessments of their criticality (Stage 2) and 
eventually develop sustainable solutions (Stage 3) for current challenges in humanitarian 
operations. Preferably, a combination of the hierarchical TISM approach proposed by Yadav 
and Barve (2016) and the framework presented in this report should be developed in order to 
take different tiers of RCCs into account and to map them correctly (e.g. 1st Tier RCCs, 2nd Tier 
RCCs and 3rd Tier RCCs). This, however, requires further analyses of the collected core 
challenges and root cause challenges including the aforementioned Total Interpretive Structural 
Modelling approach. Instead of the bottom-up presentation method that has been chosen by 
Yadav and Barve (2016), the Challenges Framework of this study might be adapted 
accordingly, indicating first, second and third tier RCCs on either side (i.e. ER and OO context) 
of the framework thus extending the current presentation method of only one level of RCCs per 
side. 
Apart from that and with regard to the second framework presented in this study, the Challenges 
Assessment Framework (Figure 13), few aspects need to be revisited or further researched 
throughout subsequent studies. First of all, with regard to the assessment of the criticality of 
different challenges (here challenge categories), the research presented in this report should be 
understood as a pilot study. For this research project, the input of nineteen respondents involved 
in the current UNHCR operation in Greece has been analyzed. Their eligibility to participate in 
the questionnaire has been accurately assured by requesting their involvement in at least one 
ER and one OO scenario thus allowing them to make informed evaluations of the scrutinized 
situations. However, there is a need for more data (i.e. larger data sets) to review and confirm 
the results of this challenges assessment with UNHCR practitioners. In doing so, as many and 
versatile HOs as possible, characterized by different sizes, mandates and geographical 
dispersion (i.e. local representations), should be involved in the assessment in order to increase 
the accuracy of results. 
Finally, more research is needed in order to assess the criticality and interrelations of challenges 
(i.e. RCCs among each other and in relation to CCs) in other contexts apart from ER and OO 
which have been covered in this study. The authors’ attempts to induce interviewed 
practitioners to also make assessments regarding the criticality of challenges (discussed by 
them) in different contexts have not been fully successful. Therefore, the study might need to 
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be repeated with other HOs. In doing so, researchers should use the same challenge categories 
but ask participants specifically to explain the criticality of discussed challenges in: 
i) different regions/countries 
ii) different cultures 
iii) different sizes of operations (i.e. the number of actors involved) 
iv) different time elapsed since occurrence of the disaster (early/mid/late ER or OO) 
v) different types of disasters (man-made vs. natural). 
However, potential researchers have to be aware that they will not receive the full assessment 
for every challenge discussed. Constraints regarding the timeslots that humanitarian workers 
are able to clear for interviews during relief operations as well as their individual experience in 
the different contexts to be assessed will always affect the extent and quality of interview 
findings. 
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8. Appendices 
8.1 Appendix A – List of Authors for Figure 9 
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Personnel 
Abidi et al. (2015); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. 
(2016); Kovács and Spens (2009); L'Hermitte et al. 
(2016); van der Laan et al. (2016); Kovács and Spens 
(2011); Majewski et al. (2010); Stapelton and van 
Wassenhove (2010); Sheppard et al. (2013); Goffnett et 
al. (2013); Maon et al. (2009) 
Abidi et al. (2014); Dahl and Lindén (2016); Jahre and 
Heigh (2008); Kovács and Spens (2009); Majewski et 
al. (2010); Maon et al. (2009); Sheppard et al. (2013); 
Tatham and Pettit (2010); Tomasini and van 
Wassenhove (2009) 
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van der Laan et al. (2016); Yadav and Barve (2016) 
Abidi et al. (2014); Kovács and Spens (2009); 
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Holguín-Veras et al. (2012) Akhtar et al. (2012) 
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Wassenhove (2014); Tatham and Pettit (2010); Tatham 
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(2009); Balcik et al. (2010); Balcik and Beamon 
(2008); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. (2016); 
Holguín-Veras et al. (2012); Kovács and Spens (2009); 
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Abidi et al. (2015);Alem et al. (2016); Apte (2009); 
Balcik et al. (2010); Baldini et al. (2012); Bealt et al. 
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Balcik et al. (2010) 
Akhtar et al. (2012); Abidi et al. (2015); Apte (2009); 
Alem et al. (2016); Balcik et al. (2010); Baldini et al. 
(2012); Bealt et al. (2016); Kovács and Spens (2009); 
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Economical 
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and Barve (2016) 
Political 
Governance 
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Kovács and Spens (2009) 
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Kovács and Spens (2009); Yadav and Barve (2016) 
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Baldini et al. (2012); Kovács and Spens (2009); 
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Abidi et al. (2015); Akhtar et al. (2012); Alem et al. 
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8.3 Appendix C – Questionnaire to UNHCR Greece 
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